Russia and the World in the Eyes of the New Generation
Agenda for the Day after Tomorrow  

Fyodor Lukyanov

CHAOS INOCULATION

Stabilization Game

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Appendix 3

CRYSTAL GAZING

Puberty and Its Effects for Russia and the EU in 2036

Alexander Vysotsky

The Ball Is in Russia’s Court  

Muamer Bećirović

Equation-2036  

Vera Ageyeva

Perhaps a Different Priority, Mr. Surkov?  

Thomas Meaney

The Climate Gamble: Poland’s Energy Sector at the Crossroads

Weronika Ksiażek

Russia–EU Relations by 2036: A Desired Future  

Leyla Daskin

Russia and Another “Abduction of Europa”  

Igor Okunev

The EU and Russia: Rescue of the Drowning Is Common Concern

Katrina Ilyinskaya

Trust Is the Only Clue  

Anastasia Pogorelskaya

Gentle Europe in the Year of the Fire Dragon  

Natalya Pomozova

Power of Global Corporations to Go in Twenty Years’ Time

Agnieszka Piwar

Values and More  

Roundtable discussion titled “The Young Generation of Russia and the West: How We Understand Each Other”

YOUNG EUROPE: SELF-PERCEPITION

Strategy: Self Comes First  

Anna Zhikhareva

Green and Flat?  

Yevgenia Prokopchuk
The very subject of relations between Russia and the EU should already be enough to make one weary. During the past quarter-century (exactly) since, in June 1994, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Union was signed on Capri, everything has already been said about it over and over again. The whole spectrum of emotions has been worn through: from mutual attraction to repulsion, from civility to anger, from business-like zeal to impotent fury. Eventually, a kind of appeasement has ensued. No harmony has been achieved, nothing of the kind – it looks more like a sense of frustration from going around in circles. So far so good maybe? No raking up the past, just taking a break—for all one knows, the overall context may change and new opportunities may turn up?

Who knows? One cannot exclude it. However, the world is changing swiftly and drastically, making sitting on the fence too risky. This manner of behavior is fraught with the risk of finding oneself in thrall to circumstances all too soon. Not the circumstances which exist now, but those which will be more compelling and will predefine the further developments. Wouldn’t it better to try and mold these circumstances ourselves before they start molding our mindset?

This collection is the result of a project called “Russia as Seen by a New Generation of Foreign Leaders,” which the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy carried out at the end of 2018 and the first half of 2019 with the support of the Presidential Grant Fund. But how did this idea come about at all?

There are several important dates to be marked this year. Apart from the 25th anniversary of official relations between Russia and the European Union, there is also the 30th anniversary of the revolution that swept through Europe in the spring-fall of 1989, changing the political landscape beyond recognition within just a span of several months. There are no longer two blocs (only one is there); the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the division of Europe and the whole world, is gone; the ideological struggle (and probably ideological pluralism, too) has ceased—socialism capitulated, capitalism is completely convinced of its rightness; the Cold War has ended; and the system of relations which determined the balance of power in the world for more than four decades has fallen apart.
Looking back thirty years ago, one probably can’t help thinking about how naïve we must have been back then. But lamenting is counterproductive. The past attitude was just as normal and natural as the current one is, because it was the result of the previous, very specific, period at that time just as the current one stems from the experience of the past thirty years now. One way or another, one thing is undeniable: those events ushered in the era of world politics we are living in now. It remains a starting point. Or does it not?

This is the question that made us ponder. Thirty years are a lot of time. A whole new generation has grown up and entered politics since then. These are the people who did not, and could not, take part in the life-changing events of the 1980s-1990s and many were not even around to see anything because they were born later. For those who did, let alone those who were directly involved in those events, it was a watershed moment that divided their life into “before” and “after.” For those who only know “after,” it is just a section in a history book, important but nonetheless abstract. But it is the “after” generation that is now entering the political stage both in the European Union and Russia. It would be reasonable to assume that Russia-EU relations will undoubtedly change when representatives of this generation take up more and more key positions in the governance system in the near future. And it would certainly be good to try and understand how they are going to change and what we should expect of each other in ten, fifteen or twenty years from now.

There was a time when everybody hoped that people living on both sides of the bygone Iron Curtain would become closer and understand each other better in an open world no longer divided along ideological lines. True, there is much more openness now and globalization is erasing physical boundaries. But for some reason this has not improved understanding. In other words, physical borders are disappearing but mental ones remain in place and sometimes even become thicker.

The Cold War, with all its ominous attributes of systemic confrontation and mutual nuclear deterrence, posturized, strange as it may sound, some kind of a ‘joint venture’ of the opposing sides. Yes, they were engaged in sustaining confrontation, but they were carefully watching that such confrontation should run its course within the framework of certain rules. Perhaps, one can call these rules safety regulations. The awareness of the danger compelled the participants to be cautious and weigh their words and actions with extra care. Let us not exaggerate the wisdom of the leaders of the day and of their entourage, things did happen, but a head-on clash was well avoided. We can thank them for that.

Those who will take the reins in the coming years lack such “joint venture” experience. It seemed for a long time that it was for the better since an addiction
to confrontation could be deadly. So, let cooperative skills develop instead even though the situation is complicated and non-linear—but not downright hostile as before. However, nonlinearity has also affected the direction of movement. Members of the “after” generation in Russia and the EU grew up and developed along divergent trajectories. The same starting point—pivotal changes at the end of the 20th century—meant different things for them. For the EU, most of the time was a story of success and moral righteousness. For Russia, it was a gut-wrenching ineptitude (impossibility) to fit into the proposed framework, followed by the growing sense of injustice over the results of the previous period and desire to make up for what had been lost in terms of status and self-respect when the Soviet Union broke up.

But no matter what path has been travelled, a new period is beginning for everybody now because the construction of Europe and the world that seemed to have no alternative thirty years ago (it is commonly referred to now as the “liberal world order”) is on the decline. And all countries will have to charter a new course of action and find a proper place in the changing system.

Our project involved a group of promising public persons from different EU countries (politicians, journalists, diplomats) within the age bracket that fit into the “after” category. These young people were invited to Moscow to participate in a workshop on different aspects of life in modern Russia and meetings with high-ranking government officials. The program also included a political simulation game, that is, an attempt to use a fictional, but not entirely surreal, scenario to see how Russia, European states, the EU, and NATO could act when dealing with a not quite standard regional conflict.

The scenario was written at the beginning of the year, the game took place in March. Clearly, we could not have known that the Republic of Moldova would face a crisis like this in June, not literally, of course, but essentially of the same kind. The privatization of the state by a concrete individual with tremendous resources, even when compared to those of the whole country, created a
unique situation where historically antagonistic parties joined their ranks and prodded external players—Russia, the EU, and the U.S.—to take joint action in order to let the state restore at least the basic forms of normal politics and resume its obligatory functions. Surprisingly, this unexpected cooperation proved successful and the powerful tycoon was stripped of power and had to run away. The coalition government of “mortal friends” started to restore the work of government institutions. It remains to be seen how long this harmony will last both between political forces of opposing views (pro-Russian and pro-European) and external patrons. The situation can easily get into the beaten track, but it surely is unusual nonetheless.

Our game showed how strong the inertia of perception is. The players simply overlooked what we thought was most important—the internal crisis of statehood and the need to rescue it in order to avoid risks for other countries. But the overall atmosphere of discussion and what is happening in Europe and Russia in general suggest that changes are unavoidable.

First of all, the importance of those “in-between” countries which provoked the strongest competition is obviously fading in the eyes of those who only recently thought it imperative to assert their primacy. Part of the reason for this is the Ukrainian tragedy—both sides have learnt their lessons. But more importantly, overall interest in Europe is waning amid the fundamental shift in the global attention from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific area. In plain words, nobody cares about it, at least not as much as only several years ago. Events that are unfolding practically in all Eastern Partnership states—Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Belarus—clearly indicate that all of them are facing acute questions of further development, their own development and stability, not the never-ending need to make a “geopolitical choice” between allegedly existing alternatives.

Secondly, those who used to clash with each other for the “spoils” are facing a new situation. Russia is slowly, but steadily, losing the inertia of perception which considered the entire territory of the former Soviet Union a priority and invariable area for active presence. This automatic perception is going away, largely because the other side has eased its pressure. The U.S. is turning towards Asia, while Europe is becoming engrossed in its own transformation, having no time to deal with the periphery just as actively as it did before. Our game generally confirmed this—the sides wanted to minimize their losses from the crisis in the imaginary country of common neighborhood, showing no enthusiasm to make any acquisitions there.

But let us go back to the main point which is relations between Russia and the European Union. This collection contains the thoughts expressed by the players and our young colleagues from Russia and the EU about what may
happen between the sides in the year 2036. The date was chosen randomly but not quite arbitrarily as this is the year of presidential election in Russia when a new head of state is to be named, someone who will replace the politician elected in 2024. In other words, it will definitely be a different generation. Hypotheses range from actual extrapolation of the current state to the future to some changes that cannot be foreseen now. But the trends noted by the participants are quite clear already now. Under no circumstances will Russia return to the model which seemed inevitable at the turn of the century and provided for some form of integration into a common political and economic project with the European Union. The reason is both the accumulated negative experience and the growing role of Asia and particularly China. While creating its own institutions, like the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia is guided by more instrumental and practical considerations than before. In other words, there is no need to expand the alliance at all costs, but rather make it more functional. As the EU experience shows, expansion is not always good for efficiency.

The European Union is also changing. It is curtailing its ambitions not so much because of overstrain but mainly because public sentiments are changing. If summarized and slightly simplified, they are quite clear: preserving the quality of life. This means security, comfortable perception of one’s identity (or maybe even mental harmony); good environment, primarily measures to reverse climate changes; balanced social policy; equality; and protection of basic rights. This is a protective conservative agenda which requires some effort but it must be directed inwards. It is not accidental that the greens, a party which advocates much of the above, scored the most vivid victory at the recent elections to the European Parliament. The international uproar over climate change has given environmental movements a winning advantage for their political campaigns. Expansionism, which dominated Europe’s outlook for almost thirty years, is going away. Global pursuits are withering away too. If this trend is considered a long-term one, and there are reasons to think so, relations are likely to develop in an unusual way.

There are positive aspects, too. The implementation of the abovementioned agenda does not presuppose geopolitical activism. In other words, the emerging trend (decreasing interest in competition and growing introversion) is likely to continue. In addition, the task of creating a comfortable environment requires pragmatic cooperation with important partners (including Russia) much more than loyalty to the ideological principles and promotion of values.

But there is also the reverse side. The “green” policy has always been quite forceful and tends to impose its system of views and priorities since this system can easily be presented as universal and the only correct one. This means that the feeling of moral superiority, which is generally characteristic of European political culture, may assume the form of “green mentality,” which
in turn will become a tool for pursuing its own interests. Russia is generally viewed in the West as a state which does not care about the environment, which makes it easier for the latter to devise its offensive tactics. On the whole, as Europe is losing international influence and some of its levers, the position of a consistent and principled advocate of such “common good” as the environment may well take the central place in the EU’s foreign policy agenda. Meanwhile, Russia has done little to promote its vision of the environmental future and has been reacting to this discussion in the West either with indifference or irritation.

And yet, Russia and the European Union will remain close and irreplaceable partners in five and even thirty years from now because geography, history and culture will not change. No matter how much the global context changes, parts of historical Europe will always be in a state of dialectical interconnection, but it will not be the same as now.

The views of the younger generation, the one which will shape up these relations in the coming decades, are very different. The inertia of the last thirty years is quite strong in what concerns Russian-European relations, but self-perception is changing quite significantly. Conclusions about the future of relations can only be made when each side understands how it should develop itself and what its priorities will be like at the next stage. Then the vision of the surrounding world may change too. For our part, we will do our best to follow the changes, starting with this project, in order to try and foretell how things will work out.
Chaos Inoculation

Kazimir Malevich
Suprematist Composition 55
Stabilization Game
Theoretical Exercises in Practical Peacemaking

As part of the project “Russia as Seen by a New Generation of Foreign Leaders”, the organizers prepared and conducted a political simulation game “Chaos Inoculation. Learning to Avoid Unpleasant Surprises in International Politics.” It involved young representatives of the political and administrative establishment, mass media, and expert community from Europe and Russia.

During the game, the participants were grouped in teams to practice political interaction in a simulated crisis in a semi-fictional country, which affected the interests of several states, including the countries and associations the participants actually represented.

The game scenario envisioned a local-regional conflict which could potentially affect the interests of all adjacent countries, including Russia and EU states. The crisis was modeled as evolutionary but deteriorated abruptly to make the game more dynamic.

The participants were tasked to devise, working jointly with the other teams, a roadmap for resolving the crisis in accordance with the realities of modern international relations.

The game sherpas informed the teams about the development of the crisis, helped the players establish internal and external communication, monitored the teams’ specific approaches towards developing and presenting their solutions, and evaluated the other participants’ reaction to the roadmaps and game interaction between the teams.
Modern Conflicts. Endogenous Factors and Resolution Problems

The scenario was built on a hypothetical, but realistic, conflict which draws on a past political experience comprising the aftermath of a severe dysfunction of a state that emerged after the disintegration of larger countries and is located “between” Russia and the EU (see Appendix 1). Such “in-between” (“limitrophe” or “subaltern”) countries abound and their problems and crises have similar features, primarily the imitational, that is, non-functional, character of state-forming institutions which serve as a façade for crony and corporate practices.

Many conflict situations between states claiming a leading role on the international stage are likely to break out because of internal crises and conflicts in these “in-between” states when large neighboring countries have to react and interfere.

As identity politics keeps gaining more significance and the world order created after the end of the Cold War continues to fall apart, the probability of conflicts, similar to the modeled one in full or in part, will increase. A deterioration of ethnic, cultural, territorial and other contradictions amidst “multipolar alienation” may lead to a “perfect storm” situation.

Crisis Scenario. The Essence of Contradictions. Participants and Resolution Tools

The specific feature of the proposed scenario is the apparent endemicity of the crisis. The system of state governance is fully subordinated to corporate interests, and as a considerable (and active) part of society does not believe in the future of the existing form of statehood, it is ready to give up state sovereignty for the sake of joining a kindred (and economically and politically more successful) people. A combination of internal and external factors involved in the conflict appears to be very important. Historical analogues of such situations can be found in the processes triggered by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, particularly events in Bosnia, political processes in the Transcaucasia and the Indo-Pakistani sub-region, as well as the Middle East. The main prototype for the simulated crisis was the Republic of Moldova, but some elements of the scenario were borrowed from similar countries such as Ukraine and Georgia (see Appendix 1 for detailed conflict scenario).
This conflict can be considered internally internationalized because according to the scenario its origin and driving forces were endogenous and located within the state in question. Two factors are important here: 1) the conflict revolved around the issue of national identity, which meant that state identity had to be given up; 2) the conflict presupposed active international participation through both jointly devised settlement measures and possible or real external interference attempts aimed at escalating the conflict.

The key actors were Russia (its political and military leadership), the EU and NATO, as well as the UN. The actions of adjacent countries were modeled by the game organizers to serve as exogenous factors which the players could not influence. As the crisis went through its stages, the participants worked out three crisis resolution roadmaps (see Appendix 3).

Analysis of Proposed Crisis Resolution Tools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed measures</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>PEO</th>
<th>GS</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-declarative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-expert</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diplomatic and declarative solutions prevailed in the game, with military solutions being third, which to some extent may signify that certain lessons were learnt from the previous crises (particularly the Ukrainian one).

It was quite unexpected that the NATO team acted as the main generator of diplomatic solutions (see Appendix 3). The team of the Presidential Executive Office (PEO) gave absolute preference to declarative measures.
In addition, the PEO team pursued its diplomatic line with due regard for the UN mandate and stressed in every way the importance of international law and the UN in resolving such conflicts. Formulated somewhat sporadically, this approach may reflect the essence of the Russian vision. Russian “politicians” tried to back up their proposals by advancing crisis resolution initiatives through international power hierarchy, while the EU and NATO teams sought to establish direct contact with the Russian leadership through “horizontal ties.”

Moreover, the game spurred “competition” between the teams representing associations of states (NATO, UN, and EU) for the right to provide the “platform” for settling the crisis, which is quite understandable: these multilateral organizations duplicate each others’ functions when it comes to multilateral cooperation in the field of conflict resolution. As a result, each team chose the most convenient way of interaction with the other players. This may explain the Russian participants’ desire to promote their initiatives through the UN (the only platform with Russian representation) and the European “military’s” proposal to establish “horizontal” contacts via the Russia-NATO Council, avoiding “redundant” structures.

General Assessment of Participants’ Conflict Resolution Approaches

The game-based modeling revealed certain peculiarities in the participants’ approaches towards settling international conflicts. They were put together in a consolidated table (see Appendix 3). The results of the practical analysis of these approaches are stated below.

Both Russian and European participants are more inclined to work out tactical, ad hoc solutions than strategic ones (one of the participants...
who represented the Russian Foreign Ministry said the sides were ready to work together even though they had no clearly formulated core interests. Both sides regarded each new stage of the crisis as a one-off, separate occurrence and did not take into account the experience of previous (even recent) events mentioned in the scenario as well as the experience of settling similar conflicts. In general, this is in line with global political trends—creation of situational alliances, disintegration of the universal strategic security system, and a multidirectional approach towards strategic deterrence issues.

On the other hand, this reflects the disappointment with the models that were previously employed for settling international crises. Speakers at the XXVII CFDP Assembly in April 2019 noted “institutional sclerosis” as an alarming sign of growing dysfunction of international institutions. Experts and politicians apparently believe that there can be no quick and effective universal solutions in such situations, and they see no point in looking for them. The growing fragmentation of the world, noted by all commentators and academics, leaves no room for universal solutions.

Setting “red lines” remains the only strategically important step. For Europeans, it is non-interference in the internal policy of other states and protection of NATO countries, even though their interpretation of non-interference differs from the Russian one. It appears that Europeans see no problem in non-forcible change of national borders approved by all sides (if it reflects the real political will of people and enlarges the area where the Western model can be applied). However, differences over one of the key European policy issues may become critical in a real situation.

The perception of the opposite side and the use of existing world politics instruments continue to be laden with stereotypes. The Russian side expressed a complete lack of trust in the institutions where Russia is not represented. The Russian approach suggests that decisions on international issues should be adopted either by the UN or, which is even better, during direct top-level negotiations. There is still a lack of trust in multilateral formats. The Russian participants are extremely sensitive to the status and degree of sovereignty and do not consider (although do not voice it publicly) “minor countries” or the EU (and even NATO in some respect) independent actors.

Both sides are gripped by “institutional” mistrust towards each other rooted in the history of relations not so much during the Cold War as after it. But this attitude does not obstruct working contacts between
relevant institutions, with the military establishing direct contact even before politicians as they appear to be more interested in direct (both in form and substance) dialogue.

One of the most painful issues was the so-called hybrid war and particularly the attitude towards the presence and activity of uncontrolled uniformed groups of unclear subordination, including private military companies (PMC). The teams failed to determine who was responsible for the activity of contract servicemen, what jurisdiction they belonged to, and who controlled them. Presumably, problems related to the unclear level and area of responsibility will pose the biggest challenge for assessment and modeling in a real situation. Attempts to hush up or talk down the problem will only increase mistrust and impair the quality of communication. World experience shows that this type of diffusive conflict interaction will become most widely spread in the years to come. This is why the exposed problems can become a serious military-political predicament.

The modelled interaction showed that in principle the European and Russian politics and experts are ready and able to establish and maintain constructive dialogue for resolving local crises which affect both sides. At the same time, their approaches do not make it possible to outline even a general plan for “a final settlement” of the crisis. It is only possible to “freeze” the situation and work out a more or less coordinated approach towards further steps in this direction. In point of fact, the coordinated consensus-based roadmap did not resolve the conflict but encapsulated it, providing only temporary guarantees that it would not spread into adjacent territories. Neither the cause of the conflict nor the consequences of its localization were analyzed thoroughly.

The game organizers stated that the players had practically disregarded the factor that had been viewed as a key one during the preparation of the scenario, namely that the conflict was caused by the inability of the state in question to ensure its own development as it was literally being devoured by internal problems which eventually spilt outside its borders. In other words, external forces simply had to interfere, whether they liked it or not, in response to the breakdown of the state governance system in the country sandwiched between them. The players immanently took the events as yet another clash of interests between Russia and the West, a fight, albeit covert, for influence on a state in their shared neighborhood. In other words, approaches were prompted by the perception of the previous period even though the real crisis mechanism was different.
Prospects for Settling Real Conflicts

Situation modeling made it possible to determine the main problems in the existing crisis-resolution approach:

1. “Peacemakers” on either side are not inclined to look into the intrinsic causes of the crisis and prefer instead to consider various ways of outside influence. This problem can be resolved only through a thorough joint examination (preferably in advance) of regional peculiarities in potential crisis-prone territories, and their real, not declared, sociopolitical systems. If a real crisis breaks out, forcible measures to prevent its escalation should be accompanied by serious expert support to the full extent possible.

2. When selecting their priorities, the sides proceed from different premises. While Europeans tend to rely on institutions constituting the crisis-stricken state and do not want to interfere in third countries’ internal affairs, Russia believes that the crisis-plagued state’s own institutions are not effective and cannot pursue a truly inclusive policy, and therefore there is no need to bother with their peculiarities. This problem can partly be solved in the way described above, but communication between the sides seeking the role of political leaders becomes vitally important. It should help work out common and uncontroversial criteria for assessing the effectiveness of political measures.

3. The sides have difficulty choosing the addressee in the country in crisis. While Europeans look (not always successfully) for ways to communicate with such country’s political elites and channel the dialogue in what they think would be the right direction, Russia believes it possible to influence these elites only through international pressure (institutions, sanctions, and even the use of force), usually indirectly. It is necessary to thoroughly study the experience of multilateral settlement of existing conflicts in order to work out the most effective ways of multilateral communication. Experience shows that it is possible to mitigate a conflict by bringing the conflicting parties into international negotiations at early stages. But “patron” states should assume public and serious responsibility for the solutions they propose (in order to avoid a negative experience similar to that in Ukraine in 2014).
Practical Recommendations for Russia

Ideally, anti-crisis interference should be aimed at settling the internal conflict in an “in-between” state, but it will always be regarded by other actors as an attempt to obtain unilateral benefits and advantages, and, therefore, will meet resistance.

Thus, the main task of world politics in the immediate future may not be ensuring classical military-political security, but taking joint measures to stabilize crisis-stricken states and territories and prevent such conflicts. If “encapsulated” conflicts exceed the “critical mass,” they may irreversibly blow up the system of relations between political players. In an interdependent world, there is practically no distinction between an internal and international crisis. To be more precise, any internal crisis may develop into an international one.

In the case of CIS, “post-Soviet” and adjacent countries (primarily those in Eastern Europe), it would be worth exploring the possibility of thorough and careful cultural and information interaction with all political forces, including opposition ones which are considered marginal.

Interaction with some external partners, first and foremost the experience of establishing political dialogue in Syria, shows that a) Russia is able to pursue such a policy; and b) in strategic terms it will help expand political communication in the region, which will boost Russia’s political authority. Eventually this may create a favorable international environment where Russia could act as a regional “security broker” along the entire length of its border.

But in doing so, it will be necessary to act with extreme caution and carefully distinguish between inclusivity in political communication and political (and information) support in order to avoid unnecessary suspicions of favoritism.

Special attention should be paid to providing academic, expert, and information-media support for political decisions, and to expanding the presence in the media and information space not by creating “alternative (i.e. secondary, reactive) information” using, for example, RT as is now the case, but by shaping the information environment of its own. This will clearly require real and broad economic, cultural, and social international cooperation at all levels (not only at the interstate one).
It is necessary to support domestic cross-cultural studies, which have secured the country its intellectual leadership and authority since Soviet times. Given the growing importance of classical force, it would be advisable to introduce a military policy, military management, and military economy course for master’s degree students majoring in social, political and economic fields (for example, at higher education institutions for high-potential employees where leading lecturers from the Military Academy of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff could be invited to do the teaching). It is also necessary to maintain direct and indirect contact between military decision-making centers at both the level of military alliances and defense ministries.

Relevant educational institutions should introduce special courses in logic and negotiating skills. The training of international relations specialists, both academic and practicing, should pay more attention to the theory of constructivism since the school of political realism, which currently prevails in the Russian theory of international relations, tends to belittle or even ignore “humanitarian” factors in world politics (identity problems, non-state actors and ensuing problems). At the same time, these issues will most likely play an increasingly growing role in “real” international relations.

An international discussion (academic, expert, and publicistic) on such humanitarian issues can help create “a comfort zone” for the development of political dialogue at the diplomatic and interstate levels (especially when it comes to issues which do not directly affect the conflicting interests of the sides). The creation of such a zone would facilitate mutual trust as a necessary (albeit not always sufficient) condition for international security.

Relevant higher education institutions should reinforce their curricula with in-depth economic and sociological programs. In the modern world, economic influence is used more often than military-political instruments and causes serious damage to the “guilty” countries, while the elevation of the internal political agenda to the external level requires an understanding of social processes. Now that traditional problems are compounded by issues of cybersecurity and the influence of media and social networks on public sentiments, “classical” education is clearly not enough for understanding modern crises. This problem can be solved through relevant in-depth studies and extra interdisciplinary courses. Teaching certain disciplines in foreign languages with the use of foreign literature could give specialists a better idea of alternative approaches and partners’
“mentality.” Understanding the basics of transnational economic relations, the major principles of global markets operation, world community development trends, and the role of new technologies in politics will allow specialists to take a fresh look at Russia’s “soft” and “hard” power, provide them with necessary instruments and help avoid obsolete clichéd solutions.

While training international relations experts and providing information support for Russia’s foreign policy in general, serious attention should be paid to prospective gamification and scenario planning. Such games can be very useful for senior international relations students and people who are not burdened with real knowledge, positions and obligations, who have reached a certain peak in mastering international law, the charters of international organizations, etc., and who could by virtue of their boldness and naiveté offer interesting recommendations to those who make real decisions. A flexible game-like approach becomes quite productive because the nature of the international environment is such that it presupposes the work of many factors and high variability of processes.

Such games may also be organized for other major educational institutions and programs (including, for example, corporate and departmental universities, depending on the audience) as well as relevant organizations as part of advanced vocational training and cooperation between think tanks.

The Roadmap

Based on the results of the game, the teams distanced themselves from settling the crisis and decided against imposing external control. We can see that the readiness to intervene declines while risks increase. The teams tried to prevent the spread of the conflict and rejected the idea of external control, thus allowing internal forces to sort out their problems themselves.

This approach is utterly wrong because the causes of the crisis are endogenous. Isolation will only make things worse, and the political system will continue to disintegrate. Sooner or later the conflict will “explode” and its fallout will contaminate the outside world.

The roadmap proposed below was worked out on the basis of the game held and recommendations made by the game sherpas. It will be
more detailed for a real situation, but its main stages/directions should be as follows:

1. Understanding the essence of a crisis—holding consultations with experts, determining the causes of the crisis, working out scenarios, identifying risks.

2. Ensuring top-level expert support either through the UN or on a bilateral basis, avoiding unnecessary structures. The latter is preferable as it will help create a comfortable ecosystem which will make it possible to restore trust and avoid an escalation of tension in the information field.

3. Guaranteeing the security of civilians, protecting minorities, and providing humanitarian assistance.

4. Determining the persons or structures to talk to.

5. Establishing a multilateral format of interaction involving all parties to the conflict (both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” stakeholders) and ensuring proper media coverage.

6. Setting and approving red lines (conflicting sides, Europe, Russia).

7. Concentrating on de-escalation of internal processes—identifying forces and working with the factors that destabilize the situation from within, influencing key beneficiaries of the conflict.

8. Stepping up work on several tracks, official and unofficial—if for some reason, for example, Russia cannot officially communicate with a representative of a certain group, this channel should be duplicated at the expert level.

9. Carrying out a well-considered information campaign (ideally a joint one)—explaining positions and showing readiness to cooperate.

10. Registering the difference in approaches—the European participants’ desire to establish “horizontal” ties and their Russian counterparts’ propensity towards a “vertical” hierarchy of power; establishing both channels if no priority method can be selected.

11. Fostering dialogue with civil society (organizing help, forming public consensus, condemning violence, etc.).
Conclusions

Scenarios for such games can serve as starting points for scenario analysis and professional thinktanks planning. The results of research may be 1) sent to government agencies responsible for developing and pursuing an international policy, and 2) used for developing new game scenarios.

The political game “Chaos Inoculation. Learning to Avoid Unpleasant Surprises in International Politics” exposed the following problems:

- Lack of attention among the European and Russian participants towards endogenous factors which are the root cause of the conflict;
- Stereotyped perception of each other and the nature of conflicts, inability to grasp qualitative changes in their origin;
- Unwillingness to distance themselves from the conflict;
- Different approaches (even conflicting in some ways) towards joint work (European “network” “horizontal” structure versus Russia’s “vertical one”).

In our opinion, it is difficult but possible to overcome these problems even though this will take a lot of time and effort. In order to normalize relations, it is necessary, first of all, to work out a common vision of the situation through dialogue with the Western expert and professional community.

The game is the first, and we believe successful, step. As a result of the game:

- The foreign and Russian participants were able to begin a constructive dialogue in order to solve the assigned tasks;
- The players got an insight into their partners’ logic;
- While making decisions on the settlement of the crisis the foreign teams relied on a variety of ideas regarding the Russian foreign policy, which they had received before the game during seminars and meetings with government officials (as borne out by the roadmaps they proposed);
• The roadmaps worked out by the Russian and Western teams named Russia as one of the international security guarantors;

• A number of problems were identified (see above) which will have to be addressed later in order to restore a constructive relationship with Western partners.

The organizers plan to continue this work to build a platform/forum for exchanging opinions and finding common solutions to international crises. We believe this work has a great potential in view of the European expert community’s commitment to further cooperation.
Appendix 1

Political Simulation Game
“Chaos Inoculation. Learning to Avoid Unpleasant Surprises in International Politics”

Basic Scenario

BRIEF INFORMATION ON BASARABIA

Basarabia is a country in Eastern Europe, a former Soviet Union republic bordering on Rumelia (a member of the European Union and NATO) and Fanagoria (which is in an acute and protracted political conflict with Russia). Rumelia is a country that is historically, culturally and ethnically close to Basarabia (some of its territories used to be part of Rumelia). Unification with Rumelia has been a cherished dream (including among the political establishment) since Basarabia gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union but has never dominated the political field either in Basarabia or Rumelia.

Basarabia has an Association Agreement with the EU and was considered a promising candidate for gradual integration only a few years ago.

The population is mixed. The majority are Basarabians (more than 70%); the country is also inhabited by Fanagorians, Russians, and Rumels (who are kindred to Basarabians), and a number of small minorities (including Muslims).

Basarabia has a serious territorial problem—a breakaway Republic of North Riverdale (RNR), which is not recognized by the world community but has long been supported by Russia. It stretches along almost the entire Basarabia-Fanagoria border. The RNR’s secession from Basarabia occurred back in the 1990s after brief, though fierce, armed clashes shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1990s, the situation in the RNR has been characterized as a “frozen conflict.”

A small contingent of Russian peacekeepers has been stationed on the territory of North Riverdale since the armed conflict (the total number of personnel is less than 2,000, or 3 battalions). The peacekeeping force stays there despite the expired mandate, Basarabia’s repeated demand for its withdrawal, and UN consonant resolutions.
The RNR’s authorities are generally pro-Russian; the population even voted in a referendum in favor of reunification with Russia (the idea received an impressive approval). At the same time, the majority of RNR residents (a third are Russians, a third are Basarabians, a little less than a third are Fanagorians, and the rest represent national minorities) have Russian, Basarabian, or Rumelian passports.

State of the Economy
The economy of this predominantly agrarian and poor country is dominated by several magnate clans. The country has a very high level of corruption (being among two hundred states in international rankings). The GDP growth is meager and is slowing down. The population is declining due to low birth rates and workforce outflow to other countries.

The only hydroelectric power plant located on the RNR’s territory provides energy for entire Basarabia. The RNR receives gas supplies from the Russian Federation via a gas pipe coming from/running through Basarabia. The gas distribution station is in the territory of Basarabia, too.

Political System
The political system has all the attributes of a fake democracy; all of the country’s political parties are believed to be actually clan puppets. Any outcome of the parliamentary elections would not change the real situation—the decisions are made as a result of deals between the shadow “owners” of the parties, with ideological affiliation being insignificant. Traditionally, the political field of Basarabia is divided into pro-Russian and pro-European forces, yet in reality the struggle of various interest groups is not related to this division, as each easily changes its colors when necessary.

Foreign Policy
Basarabia formally proclaimed European integration as its goal; the country has an Association Agreement with the European Union. At the same time, the EU, which is experiencing serious internal problems, is inactive in facilitating the integration process. A robust integration with Basarabia or other post-Soviet countries in the region is not a priority for Brussels. This is one of the reasons for the weakening of the integration discourse in Basarabia, with the population gradually losing hope of ever joining the EU.
Russia and the World in the Eyes of the New Generation

Society

Public trust in the institutions of power is painfully low. Society is largely disengaged and apathetic.

As Basarabia’s state administration system is degrading, a public movement for reunification with neighboring Rumelia, a historically and ethnically kindred country that is member of the EU (and NATO), is gathering momentum. The idea is not new, but its advocates remained in a clear minority for years. They were opposed by Basarabian nationalists, who strongly upheld sovereignty and would not abandon Basarabian identity in favor of a related, yet different, Rumelian identity. Now, however, the proponents of unification have secured support from various Basarabian parties, as the issue has acquired a different significance: the country’s absolutely dysfunctional political system may turn Basarabia into a failed state and threatens its very existence. The advocates of unification insist that, given all costs, it will provide a chance for the survival and development of Basarabia within a larger and stronger state.

A number of reunification activists won the parliamentary election as members of different parties, most of them (but not only) as members of an utterly right-wing populist party “For the Future of the Nation” (FFN). “New unionists” are straight-out Eurosceptics; they consistently point out that, first, the EU has not moved a finger to truly help Basarabia but used it exclusively for its selfish purposes, and, second, European integration itself has long become an instrument for suppressing the sovereignty and independence of minor nations in favor of an ultra-liberal social model based on the destruction of traditional values and economic exploitation by the EU major states. Also, the FFN takes a clearly anti-Russian position claiming that the “Russian occupation” is the main threat to Basarabia’s future and that the country will not be able to resist it because the political class of Basarabia is totally corrupted. So, unification with Rumelia is a way to avoid Russification. The FFN maintains relations with extremist right-wing forces within the European Union, primarily in culturally close France and Italy, and also with Rumelian nationalist forces whose influence in Basarabia is growing as Rumelia’s relations with Brussels get ever more conflicting over corruption and budgetary issues.

Many in Basarabia and in the European Union are confident that the FFN is a “spoiler party” nurtured by Moscow in order to further destabilize the situation in the European Union. The fact that Sputnik-Basarabia, the country’s most widely read media source, and the
Kremlin’s RT TV channel extensively discuss the events in Basarabia, is seen as evidence of contacts with Russia.

Russia, in turn, sharply criticizes the FFN and the idea of unification with Rumelia, presenting it as an attempt to destroy the Basarabian statehood and to drag the country into NATO in a completely illegal way, in order to create another bridgehead in the zone of Russia’s strategic interests.

Information about the financial backing of the FFN is controversial. Some believe that it is supported by an oligarch, Ivan Offshore, who mostly stays in Russia but is actively involved in Basarabian politics. Others insist that the main sponsor of the FFN is the most powerful tycoon in Basarabia, the de facto owner of the country, Renat Khorosheveli, who manipulates all parties and uses the FFN in his intricate game aimed to maintain control over the country. Still others hold that the money comes directly from Rumelian nationalists. There are those who insist its real source is controlled by ultra conservative circles in the U.S., which, in turn, are funded by the CIA.

A loud scandal has broken out in the media over the withdrawal from Basarabia of €6 billion allocated by the European Union to harmonize the country’s digital infrastructure with that of the EU.

**Gameplay**

**GAME START**

During the morning coffee, the organizers make an announcement and distribute information leaflets stating that the Basarabian parliament voted to hold a referendum on unification with Rumelia.

Additional information is attached to the announcement:

In a recent emotional speech FFN leader Sevastian Dorda blamed the government and the entire ruling class of Basarabia of “genocide against the state.” He called for holding a referendum on reunification with Rumelia in the name of the country’s salvation. The Speaker of the Parliament representing Khorosheveli’s The Bright Path party, confident that the proposal would fail, put it to the vote in a bid to exert pressure on the other factions. To everyone’s astonishment, the Basarabian parliament voted (on a small margin) for holding a referendum on unification with Rumelia.
Journalists believe that such an outcome is a coincidence of circumstances—from miscommunication between interest groups which decided that some new game had begun, to very clever work of FFN political technologists, who had bought over some of the deputies from other factions, to the revenge by some tycoons on Khorosheveli who had “crossed the red line.”

The announcement of the referendum has taken all external players, both to the west and east of Basarabia, by surprise. Within Basarabia, a sharp political struggle breaks out; the question put to the national
referendum is so vital that it has awaken previously indifferent citizens. The leadership of the unrecognized RNR debates over its course of action, and North Riverdale inhabitants are much agitated with the news. Brussels is extremely concerned, while Moscow does not fully comprehend what is happening.

STAGE 1.

Sevastian Dorda’s appeal gets a broad support among the proponents of unification. Dorda and his allies stake on street marches and demonstrations, vowing to denounce the dead-end version of statehood in favor of “a new future within Great Rumelia.” They are opposed by “national-sovereignists” who enjoy support from Khorosheveli and other tycoons (who also finance the FFN, just in case).

The Russian-speaking diaspora is worried about possible “Rumelization” but is politically disunited. It has activists who believe that the situation should be used to boost Russia’s influence; they maintain that Russia should support “national-sovereignists” under the condition of future de-oligarchization of Basarabia and its reorientation towards Russia. They also argue that the idea of Basarabia’s reunification with the RNR should be supported in order to radically change the political landscape of Basarabia.

In North Riverdale, politically activities are on the rise, too. The people are concerned about the events in Basarabia. Basically skeptical/indifferent about the idea of Basarabian-Rumelian unification, they now fear that Basarabia, with the support of Rumelia (or already as part of Rumelia), may try to regain control over the RNR’s territory. At the same time, tentative ideas are voiced that joining Rumelia as part of Basarabia could be helpful in solving a number of problems of the region, which got tired of almost thirty years of existence as a “para-state.” The RNR’s leader Stepan Loiko-Zbruch rushes to Moscow for consultations but finds that the Kremlin has no clear position about what to do.

Prominent members of the Muslim minority of Basarabia (both in Basarabia itself and in the RNR) claim to suffer from repressions and attacks by both the Basarabian and Russian-speaking majority.

An initiative group of national unionists in Rumelia comes forth with a proposal to hold a referendum on integration with Basarabia simultaneously with Basarabian plebiscite. Otherwise, they threaten the Rumelian government with a nation-wide protest campaign and impeachment.
Sofia Kovalevich, a famous writer and publicist of world renown, a nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize in literature, disappears in Basarabia. She was collecting materials for a new book on the European national identity of the Basarabians. Rumor has it that she was planning to visit North Riverdale to meet with progressive pro-European representatives of the Muslim minority there.

Stephen Bannon is planning a visit to Rumelia to promote his Eurosceptic consolidation program.

STAGE 2.

Rallies of supporters and opponents of unitarism in Basarabia turn into clashes. In the RNR, supporters of unification with Basarabia (and of unitarism) meet a tough response from the RNR authorities.

In Rumelia, the nationalist party delivers an ultimatum to the government: If it does not officially support the idea of unification, the party will launch a nation-wide protest campaign and announce recruitment of supporters into voluntary corps of solidarity with the Basarabian “brothers”. Actually, the recruitment is already underway.

According to unconfirmed but widely circulated information, “dozens, if not hundreds” of servants of the Russian PMC group ‘Strauss’ arrive in the RNR. They take control of infrastructure facilities and government agencies’ buildings.

In Fanagoria, nationalist movements claim that the North Riverdale region has never had anything to do with Russia but is the ancestral territory of Fanagoria. Therefore, Fanagoria should welcome unification of Basarabia (without the RNR) with Rumelia, and “integrate” the RNR in itself. This idea finds an echo with part of ethnic Fanagorians living in the RNR.

Fanagoria alerts the armed forces on the border with North Riverdale/Basarabia. It claims that everything that is happening is a provocation by Russia in order to set the stage for a major military operation under the pretext of protecting the rights of ethnic Russians in the RNR and seize the south-eastern part of Fanagoria.

The Irish Republican Army publicly supports the idea of Basarabia’s and Rumelia’s reunification, stating that a new era of “national awakening” is dawning on Europe and that “it is time to put together what belongs together.” The Parliament of Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina
adopts a resolution stating that it is time to bring the arbitrarily drawn borders on the European map in balance with the aspirations of the peoples. Similar statements are made by the Croatian nationalist party.

In Rumelia, Fanagoria and Russia, the first refugees from Basarabia appear; they tell about acts of violence, robberies and threats to life. The flow of refugees increases.

STAGE 3.

In the RNR, a group of Russian-speaking activists emerges, demanding a referendum on non-violent annexation of the region to Russia under the slogan “Peace for Russians!” (which can also be read as “A World for Russians!”). Pro-Fanagorian activists raise the issue of the RNR’s unification with Fanagoria, while the idea of its Rumelization is growing among ethnic Basarabians.

The President of Basarabia makes a decision to disperse unionists’ rallies with the use of force and imposes the state of emergency. Parliament suspends the president (a common practice in Basarabia) and denounces the imposition of the state of emergency.

A Union of Volunteer Battalions of Fanagoria, which unites veterans of the counter-separatist military operation, declares its readiness to help Basarabia to ensure a forced return of North Riverdale. Some nationalist parties in Fanagoria welcome this declaration.

At the same time, one of the authoritative commanders of the People’s Militia of the Free Territories of Fanagoria (uniting anti-government separatist rebels) declares that he and his men will come to the rescue of the inhabitants of North Riverdale should military force be used against them.

The government of Fanagoria imposes martial law throughout Fanagoria.

The government of the RNR also declares a martial law regime and preparations for the mobilization of the population.

An attempt is made/prevented of a sabotage at the Basarabian hydropower plant located in North Riverdale (the only electricity source for Basarabia).
## General Characteristics of Roadmaps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Teams</th>
<th>Russian Teams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal-Setting</strong></td>
<td>• Preventing escalation of violence (both “qualitative” and “quantitative”—third parties’ participation—and “geographical”).&lt;br&gt;• Solving concrete humanitarian problems as they come up.&lt;br&gt;• Protecting EU and NATO countries.</td>
<td>• Preserving status quo.&lt;br&gt;• Preventing conflict escalation.&lt;br&gt;• Preventing NATO’s official movement into the crisis area.&lt;br&gt;• Protecting the interests of compatriots abroad.&lt;br&gt;• Ensuring inviolability of existing borders (North Riverdale within Basarabia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General political assessment of the situation</strong></td>
<td>• Referendum in Basarabia is without a doubt legitimate (because it is Basarabia’s internal political affair).&lt;br&gt;• Basarabia is deemed a politically viable country.&lt;br&gt;• Russia is a rather reliable partner to work with.&lt;br&gt;• The problem can hardly be solved without Russia, so it has to be worked with.&lt;br&gt;• It is better to discuss issues with Russia by contacting its top leadership directly.</td>
<td>• The legitimacy of the referendum in Basarabia is doubtful because it fails to take into account the interests of all sides concerned (particularly the population of North Riverdale).&lt;br&gt;• Limitrophe states are not deemed politically viable but remain capable of undertaking destructive actions (primarily Fanagoria).&lt;br&gt;• The political independence of the EU is questioned (not publicly).&lt;br&gt;• It is better to address issues by showing determination and bring them to the attention of the UN as the only authoritative international forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived threats</strong></td>
<td>• Uncontrolled migration;&lt;br&gt;• Overall increase in violence in the region.&lt;br&gt;• Uncontrolled interference by third parties.&lt;br&gt;• Geographical expansion of the conflict.</td>
<td>• Change of borders in the region.&lt;br&gt;• Physical and political threat to the Russian-speaking population.&lt;br&gt;• Overall increase in violence in the region.&lt;br&gt;• Threat to Russia’s political interests;&lt;br&gt;• Geographical expansion of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Priorities
- Acting through existing institutions and structures (including EU national and international ones).
- Readiness to give up EU immediate enlargement plans for the sake of conflict resolution.
- Containing NATO.
- Acting through the UN.
- Maintaining Russia’s geopolitical influence in the region.
- Direct interventionism is possible.

### Respect for interests
- Declaring maximum inclusivity both in political processes and crisis resolution procedures.
- When declaring universalism, the focus tends to be on the interests of minorities.
- A high level of trust in decisions adopted by local institutions in the crisis area.
- Declaring maximum inclusivity both in political processes and crisis resolution procedures (with emphasis expressly placed on the need to take into account the interests of the Russian-speaking population in the first place).
- Low level of trust in decisions adopted by institutions in the crisis area.
- Great-powerness (unwillingness to view not only limitrophe states but also the EU as active participants).
- Readiness to use peacekeepers for geopolitical bargaining (without giving much thought to how such decisions may affect the peacekeepers themselves).

### Interventionism
- Low to middle. Military (and peacekeeping) interventionism is a last resort.
- Tend to go beyond the formal limits of their institutions’ possibilities (NATO agrees to exert political pressure on Fanagoria).
- Increased readiness—all the way up to sending an additional military contingent to RNR (without proper international legitimization).

### Initiative
- Tend to take time in order not to force events.
- Reactive, waiting for Europeans’ actions, ready to respond decisively.

### Reference to historical analogues
- Reference to deployment of NATO troops in Bosnia as an example of inopportune political decision.
- Crimea is not regarded as an analogue of a possible solution.
- Crimea is not regarded as an analogue of a possible solution.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches towards organizing communicative environment</th>
<th>European Teams</th>
<th>Russian Teams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Calls to openness.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Calls to openness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Readiness to use secure (secret) channels of</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Readiness to use secure (secret) channels of communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• During joint “news conferences” the Russian side (sometimes) caustically “trolls” the EU with a focus on formal-legalistic rhetoric.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Certain multilateral initiatives put forth by the UN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>team deemed hardly implementable at first.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In communicating with Russia, prefer to contact “directly the top leadership” via envoys (bypassing the team with which they communicate at joint “news conferences”).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3.

Participants’ Roadmaps

1. Teams’ Solutions

Diplomatic solutions rank first (see the Table below), followed by information-declarative ones, with humanitarian and military solutions being third (in equal proportions).

2. Consolidated Table (by stage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team/Steps</th>
<th>Diplomatic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Information-declarative (media)</th>
<th>Information-expert</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Instrument Analysis

European teams choose diplomatic solutions more often, while Russian teams (including the UN team) prefer media-declarative ones.
4. Teams’ Roadmaps

Code-name for the steps proposed by the teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Dip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Econom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information-declarative (media)</td>
<td>Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information-expert (+intelligence)</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stage 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teams</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership of Europe [EU]</td>
<td>Human</td>
<td>1. Declare that the EU is extremely worried about the disappearance of writer Sofia Kovalevic and demands a full investigation into her abduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>2. Appoint a special EU envoy for traveling to Basarabia and conducting negotiations with both parties to the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military leadership of Europe [NATO]</td>
<td>Dip/Expert</td>
<td>1. Contact the EU to work out and announce a coordinated statement on the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip-3</td>
<td>2. Hold secret negotiations with Russia on the following issues: • All parties, including Russia, refrain from escalating the conflict; • NATO neither supports, nor provokes events in Basarabia; • Stress the legitimacy of the Basarabian parliament’s decision: Basarabians have a right to a referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>3. Urge Rumelia to remain neutral and not to harp upon its own referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>4. Publicly declare solidarity with Rumelia as a member of the Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>5. Plan B: prepare the troops for redeployment to Rumelia in case “Russia makes a move.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership of Russia (Presidential Executive Office)</td>
<td>Dec-3</td>
<td>1. Publish a declaration stating that: • the political future of Basarabia is its own internal affair; • decisions on the political future of Basarabia must take into account the interests of all regions of Basarabia and all of its citizens, including those living abroad; • decisions implemented without complying with the abovementioned conditions may seriously jeopardize the security of Basarabia and the whole of Europe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Stage 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teams</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military leadership of Russia [General Staff]</strong></td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>1. Improve the combat capability of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the RNR, with a focus on the security of the bases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>2. Non-interference in Basarabia’s internal affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>3. Initiate military-to-military dialogue between Russia and NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Expert-political group</strong></td>
<td>Dec-5</td>
<td>1. Make a media statement concerning:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human-3</td>
<td>• restrictions for the parties involved;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• references to the UN constituent instruments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• a call for dialogue;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• inclusion of the minority in the agenda;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• concern about the fate Sofia Kovalevic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>2. Create a working group to discuss the worst possible scenario (determine which resources the UN could use in this case).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip-2</td>
<td>3. Build channels of communication:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interstate (with the EU, Russia, Basarabia, Rumelia, Fanagoria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Internal (with representatives of North Riverdale, political parties and movements, primarily unionists).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political leadership of Europe [EU]</strong></td>
<td>Human</td>
<td>1. Declare that the EU is extremely worried about the disappearance of writer Sofia Kovalevic and demands a full investigation into her abduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>2. Appoint a special EU envoy for traveling to Basarabia and conducting negotiations with both parties to the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>3. Plan to pursue a “carrot and stick” policy with regard to Fanagoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>4. Say that Rumelia needs a counter-proposal for Basarabia (not specified).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>5. Dispatch European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to Moscow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military leadership of Europe [NATO]</strong></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>1. Urge Fanagoria to stay calm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>2. Obtain reliable information about the Russian presence (sic!) in North Riverdale via own intelligence services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip-2</td>
<td>3. Two messages for Rumelia:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “Keep a tight rein” on your nationalists;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• NATO will by all means come to Rumelia’s assistance in case of aggression against it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>4. Demand that the Russian military “establish control” over “contract servicemen” and defuse the situation in North Riverdale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Date</td>
<td>Event Type</td>
<td>Event Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dec-2      | Military leadership of Europe [NATO] | 5. Two public statements:  
- NATO is worried about the situation;  
- If the situation deteriorates, NATO has a right to defend its member. |
|            |            | 6. Organize the NATO Secretary-General’s trip to Rumelia. |
|            |            | 7. Actively promote the discussion of the situation at the Russia-NATO Council, step up its work. |
| Dec        | Political leadership of Russia (Presidential Executive Office) | 1. Declaration: Given the need to keep Basarabia peaceful and prosperous, the Russian side wishes to emphasize that any plans to deploy NATO infrastructure or personnel in Basarabia would be a red line for regional security. Regional security cannot be achieved amid Basarabia’s potential integration into Rumelia, which is a NATO member country, as part of Basarabia’s political class demands. |
|            |            | 2. Russia proposes convening an urgent UN Security Council meeting. The main proposal: Basarabia’s neutral status must be formalized officially. If it is guaranteed, a possible withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers from North Riverdale may be considered in the future. |
|            |            | 3. Russia urges its Western partners to use their influence with the leaders of Fanagoria and Rumelia in order to prevent a negative external impact on the current political developments in Basarabia. |
|            |            | 4. Russia reserves the right to act as it sees fit in order to ensure its own security and the security of Russian citizens and allies. Military exercises in the Southern Military District are part of these efforts. |
|            |            | 5. Russia denies any deployment of paramilitary personnel to Basarabia and stresses that all of Russian transport flights, including regular supplies for the Russian peacekeeping missions in the region, are transparent and go exclusively through the Basarabian capital’s airport. |
| Mil/Dec    | Military leadership of Russia (General Staff) | 1. Keep the Russian peacekeeping contingent at the bases on hair-trigger alert. |
| Dec        |            | 2. Declare that the private military company Strauss has nothing to do with the Russian Defense Ministry or other security agencies. |
|            |            | 3. Start military exercises in the Southern Military District as planned in advance. |
|            |            | 4. Hold Russia-NATO consultations:  
- on the prevention of Fanagoria’s involvement in the events in Basarabia;  
- on the prevention of foreign irregular armed groups’ involvement in the events in Basarabia;  
- On ways to de-escalate the internal conflict in Basarabia. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teams</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military leadership of Russia (General Staff)</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>5. Continue contingency planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Expert-political group</td>
<td>Dec-3</td>
<td>1. Stress the need to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human-1</td>
<td>• observe the inviolability of the borders;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• respect the rights of minorities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• establish channels of communication through personal contacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human</td>
<td>2. Engage with the Investigative Committee on Violent Crimes in order to find Sofia Kovalevic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>3. Adopt a UN Security Council resolution on UN observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>4. Establish, under the UN auspices, a commission of neighboring states, which will include all sides concerned: Basarabia, Rumelia, Russia, Fanagoria, the EU, and North Riverdale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership of Europe [EU]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec-3</td>
<td>1. The EU does not support the creation of volunteer military formations in Rumelia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human/Econom</td>
<td>2. The EU provides logistic support and funding to the Rumelian government to enable it to effectively solve the problem of refugees on the basis of the Dublin System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip-3</td>
<td>3. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy F. Mogherini will go on an official visit to the region and Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The EU's negotiating position:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• reaffirm solidarity with Rumelia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• urge Fanagoria and Basarabia to bring paramilitary units back to their bases;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• demand that Russia withdraw its PMC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip-3</td>
<td>4. Bring the abovementioned issues to the EU's attention as part of its agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>5. With a view to avoiding further escalation of the situation in the region, the problem should be addressed at the level of the Russia-NATO Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military leadership of Europe [NATO]</td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>1. Further attitude towards Fanagoria depends on how responsibly it acts (that is, Fanagoria is unconditionally recognized as one of the parties concerned and actors in a potential conflict).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>2. Ask Russia to distance itself from North Riverdale activists [apparently, they fear a repetition of the “Russian Spring”; a purely political declaration].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec/Dip</td>
<td>3. Publicly reaffirm full support for Rumelia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military leadership of Europe (NATO)</td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>4. Convene a session of the Russia-NATO Council to discuss the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>1. Russia registers effective pressure on Rumelia by NATO partners and thanks the Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec-4</td>
<td>2. Russia states that NATO’s pressure on Fanagoria proved ineffective. Russia blames continuing instability in Basarabia on Fanagoria and demands that reports about Strauss and the Sofia Kovalevic incident be recognized as provocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Econom-3</td>
<td>3. Russia proposes imposing UN sanctions on Fanagoria (including its political, military and economic leadership) for supporting and perpetrating interference in Basarabia’s internal affairs. It also proposes suspending IMF, U.S., and EU financial assistance to Fanagoria. Russia is also ready to help create economic incentives to compel the Fanagorian leadership to act responsibly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>4. Political declaration: Russia sees that the voting in the Basarabian parliament has blown up the situation in the country. No democratic referendum is possible in the current situation. So if it initiates anything like that, it could evoke a consolidated negative international reaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil-2/ Human-2</td>
<td>5. Russia approves the deployment of the UN mission to support UN observers on the borders of Basarabia. It is ready to provide its own contingent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec-3</td>
<td>6. Russia supports the idea of holding a new nationwide election in Basarabia. The election cannot be considered legitimate unless voters in North Riverdale take full part in it and Basarabian citizens living abroad get the opportunity to vote. Russia believes that the restoration of statehood in Basarabia must proceed under close international control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership of Russia (Presidential Executive Office)</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>1. Use the peacekeeping contingent to ensure the security of infrastructure in North Riverdale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>2. Continue the military exercises in the Southern Military District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>3. Preserve calm and restraint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil/Dip</td>
<td>4. Ask the UN to formulate a new mandate for the mixed peacekeeping force in Basarabia (with the participation of Russia and other countries, preferably non-NATO ones).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Expert-political group</td>
<td>1. Make statements: • on the inadmissibility of external interference; • on the protection of ethnic minorities and the need to find Sofia Kovalevic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>2. Appoint a UN special envoy to Basarabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip</td>
<td>3. Draft and sign a binding agreement between Basarabia, Rumelia, Russia, the EU, NATO, and Fanagoria. The agreement should mention (among other things) the inviolability of the 1991 borders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Puberty and Its Effects for Russia and the EU in 2036

Alexander Vysotsky

Making such forecasts is an unrewarding task. Writers are gifted in this sense [see Moscow 2042 by Vladimir Voinovich] to a far greater extent than international or domestic policy pundits. Yet, let’s give it a try.

If Russia-EU relations are compared to a romantic relationship, then the 1990s and early 2000s were a period of strong affection and mutual expectations. Both parties preferred to turn a blind eye to each other’s flaws and focus on each partner’s most attractive features, which is natural when a couple is dating.

When it turned out that each side had different ideas of a future “family life” and divergent views on various political, economic, and cultural aspects, a mutual cooling off period followed. Apparently, this was unavoidable even without the Ukrainian crisis. The latter merely served as a catalyst and a fresh confirmation of the saying that hate is just one step away from love.

In contrast to human beings, neighboring countries are doomed to some sort of interaction regardless of their emotional background and historical traumas. Even former spouses may establish decent relations of respect sometime after the divorce, providing this meets their interests.

The mid-2030s may be the right time for creating precisely this model of a dialogue between Russia and the European Union, one that is worthy of adult partners in their own right and distinguished by mutual respect. Even more so, since both parties have already accumulated a certain potential of good will.

There are several objective reasons pushing events in this direction. The main one is external to both Russia and the European Union. The center of gravity of the world economy and politics is rapidly drifting eastwards, towards Asia. All European capitals, including Moscow, more often than not look in this direction, and not at each other. The European Union, though, has to be on guard all the time, uncertain as to what the United States will say. The latter traditionally invests a lot to worsen
the relationship between the European Union and Russia. However, if the bulk of this “investment” is eventually redirected towards China—and there are solid reasons to expect this will happen—then Russia and the European Union will have more windows of opportunity. And if China succeeds in its undertakings, then open enmity will be a great hindrance to two major links of the One Belt-One Road from China. So good manners are crucial. Noblesse oblige.

Another major reason for maturing is to leave illusions behind about a common European home, a joint system of security, and many other beautiful, yet empyrean products of wishful thinking. Not setting too ambitious, yet hardly achievable, goals is the surest way to steer clear of the feeling of utter frustration and depression after failed attempts to attain them. Cross-border cooperation programs and scientific and student exchanges, and in the longer term the cancellation of visa formalities, may not look as great as a European Security Treaty or an adapted version of the CFE Treaty, but can be far more useful in reality.

Also, the European Union–Eurasian Union/European Commission-Eurasian Economic Commission format may be very helpful in establishing a dialogue, provided it is regular and replaces the deceased Russian Government–European Commission mechanism and Russia-EU summits.

Reason three is the lessons of the Ukrainian crisis for the parties involved. In fact, it is still too early to judge what these lessons are and how well they have been learned. But it is beyond doubt that some conclusions have been derived already. This means that those involved will be more cautious and thoughtful in their policies in Central and Eastern Europe, including the post-Soviet space and the Balkans.

To have a sensible counterbalance to such optimism (albeit reserved) let us describe a sadder scenario. Its key features are cold estrangement and permanent mutual suspicion (regularly fueled by crises in “buffer” countries with a no man’s land status) and thriving on a deadly cocktail of propaganda and historical phobias. This option is quite possible, too. In fact, it is only slightly less probable because of its objective inferiority to the former picture.

Of course, much will depend on the results of internal transformations in Russia and the European Union. Both parties have entered a period of ideological, governmental, and generational
transit. This is going to be a bumpy road (all such roads are), but it has to be walked somehow—at the height of puberty desirable mature relations are impossible to build. At a time when the very future of the European Union is at stake, the chances of seeing a consistent foreign policy on any track, including the Russia one, look slim. Inside Russia, too, the messages are very controversial. Draw the shape of a future government mechanism, let alone predict its foreign policy aims, is rather hard.
The Ball Is in Russia’s Court

Muamer Bećirović

As I was working on the biography of Klemens von Metternich, the founder of the balance of power in the European concert of powers in the 19th century, I inevitably got to conclusions about Russia, which was an essential part of Metternich’s concept. What was happening in Russia under tsar Alexander I was very similar to what is taking place under Putin in 2019—not learning lessons from history. From Alexander I up to the presidency of Vladimir Putin two red lines ran throughout the history of Russian power transition: stability or chaos. Nothing between these two extremes. Little could be seen of progress, continuity or powerful institutions that would provide for some strategy for future development. Russia lost its imperial status because of its own mistakes, not because of external pressure.

So, what will the EU-Russian relations be like in 2036? Historians tend to avoid giving forecasts, especially those of them who are generally skeptical and know that it is easy to slide to a catastrophe scenario. However, as an optimist I believe the future of the relations between Russia and the EU is not gloomy. True, during my recent trip to Moscow I could see that the current Russian administration is caught up by circumstances and past experience. So, I don’t think that things will change much under Putin. A far more interesting question is how Russia and its elites will behave after Putin is gone.

Every German chancellor and French president eventually come to an understanding (and some need more time for that than others) that they need Russia for a stable Europe. And the European elites are completely aware that a closer cooperation with Russia is essential. The first German Chancellor to realize and vigorously enforce it was Gerhard Schröder. Not because he was enchanted with the flair of the Romanovs, but because he knew that without Russia there could be no stable Europe able to pursue an independent foreign policy.

If Russia, forced by the situation, gives up its hegemonic ambitions to influence Eastern European territories (Moldova, Ukraine, etc.) — and now things look like that—then the Europeans will start seeking more cooperation with it. Moscow will have to overcome injured pride.
somehow. The Europeans should help Russia cure the psychological wound by offering closer cooperation in the economic and security spheres, while at the same time not allowing Russia to exert more influence on the former Soviet republics. And it seems Russia has begun to realize that the imperial times for it are over.

The younger generation of the Russian elites seem to be more technocrats and realists. They should open their country to the West, especially in what concerns the country’s economic goals. The Russian president after Putin will build his legitimacy of rule on the promise of economic progress. And I can imagine this new political circle leaning more on the West than on China.

With whom is Russia’s interdependence tighter? With the EU or China? Definitely with China. Russia’s status in the new European concert is based on person-to-person diplomacy more than its status in relations with China is. But that is only one side of the complex relations: Russians’ connection with Europeans in economic and cultural terms is bigger than that with the Chinese. So, the question is this: Will Russia hold onto its imperial approach to the European region and will the EU be capable of deepening relations with it? From Europeans’ point of view, the future relationship depends on how Russia will behave and which goals it will set. The ball is in Russia’s court now, even if Europeans would be cleverer than now in winning over Russia as a partner.

As I have already mentioned, the new Russian president will have no choice but promise economic progress. I can see the young generation’s willingness to cooperate on economic issues (Alikhanov, governor of the Kaliningrad Region, is a key figure here). On the other hand, when we visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we saw the greatest intransigence in obvious questions—even among young people who will one day take over. This suggests that the change in relations will not come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The future of Russia-EU relations will therefore primarily depend on how Russia behaves. The EU will adapt to Russia’s plans—as it has been doing since 1945. Even if Russia moves closer to the EU, it will want to benefit from both the EU and Asia. It will most likely try to function as a bridge to both directions and to profit from it. The EU in its current state is too weak to tie up Russia more to itself than China can. It remains to be seen whether there will be more changes in Russia’s development in the period up to 2036.
Many in Russia say our country not only has an unpredictable future, but also has had an unpredictable past. Relations with Europe can be looked at through the same lens: historical periods of rapprochement and stable and friendly relations repeatedly gave way to confrontation, denial of cultural and ideological kinship, and the rewriting of history. Neither Russia nor Europe have developed an unambiguous understanding of the historical mission and cultural significance of the East (as represented by Russia) and of the West (as represented by Europe) for each other.

There are enough reasons to assume that this question will remain unanswered for either party for several decades to come. In the meantime, the political and economic relations between Russia and Europe will certainly continue to develop. This expansion will depend on a number of factors, both internal and external.

Three main ones are worth pointing out.

Factor one is the inevitable internal changes in European Union countries concerning the demographic and the ensuing cultural transformation of most societies, above all in Central Europe. The way I see it, this transformation will not be as dramatic as the current ultra-right and ultra-conservative political forces in the EU expect it to be. The European system of assimilation, which works very slowly, but eventually will be very effective, will remain in operation to recode the new generations of the previous waves of migration. The new citizens will identify as Europeans, but their cultural code will have an impact on a new understanding of Europe and its values and role in the world. The factor of an aging population will continue to make itself felt on the role of the Old World in global affairs: the growing social burden on the EU economies will dictate its own agenda, with foreign policy ambitions far from being a high priority.

The second factor that will considerably influence Russian-European relations are the external shocks and challenges to Europe proper. Already now officials in Brussels and European capitals tend to look with fear at China’s growing economic might, which is already clearly
in view in Europe (for instance, at Greek ports). European politicians are nervous about their inability to create a counterbalance to pressure from the East. The Chinese factor will push Europe towards its “natural” ally, the United States, because the economic, technological, and military center of gravity still remains on the other side of the Atlantic. Already now the European establishment is greatly concerned about the lack of a European equivalent of GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon) and about technological lagging behind the United States in general. The European-U.S. tendency to close ranks will not necessarily be outspokenly anti-Russian. Under a favorable scenario Europe, too, may seek to overcome disagreements and achieve closer cooperation with Russia, which may provide both sides with a counterbalance to Chinese hegemony in Eastern Eurasia.

Factor three is the internal social-economic and political development of Russia. Russian demographic forecasts remain pessimistic: the low labor force participation rate continues to considerably influence economic security and, in general, stability in the country. In the context of such demographic forecasts, a sober look at Russia’s further development prompts that in its foreign policy Russia should pursue a more rational course by seeking a mutually beneficial compromise with Europe or, at least, maintaining a balance between the West (Europe) and the East (China). Russia’s foreign policy, in particular, its strategy towards Europe, will be strictly determined by the country’s internal social and economic development. This constitutes the key distinction of its behavior from that of its European counterparts, where such correlation will be absent.

The likely scenarios of Russian-European relations based on the above-described factors may look like this.

**Scenario 1:** The status quo remains, with both Russia and Europe taking a passive attitude to bilateral relations. This scenario may work up to 2036, but in the longer term it will be amended under pressure from the factors in question. This scenario is neutral by and large, but negative to a certain extent, because both sides’ policies are reactive and, consequently, not aimed at achieving certain aims and are less effective.

**Scenario 2:** Preservation of a quasi-Cold War in relations between Russia and Europe, with the latter drifting ever closer to the United States in order to maintain its own security, including economic stability. This scenario is also negative for both sides, because if it does not
implement an independent foreign policy, Europe may become an instrument of advancing U.S. interests. This situation will undoubtedly adversely influence the economic development of European countries and also aggravate the crisis of identity.

**Scenario 3:** Eliminating the current contradictions (including the sanctions standoff, which is harmful to both sides) between Russia and Europe, which will be pushed ahead with an independent foreign policy strategy. This scenario will certainly be positive for both sides, because it will make it possible to use the historically established economic ties to mutual benefit and also ensure comprehensive security.

To get back to my idea of an unsolved equation between Russia and the West, I would dare say that the question of the cultural and ideological importance of Russia and Europe for each other does not necessarily require an unequivocal answer. Possibly, the real mission of Russia and Europe in relation to each other is to remain an enigma and the center of infinite attraction in the search for answers and distinctions.
Perhaps a Different Priority, Mr. Surkov?

*Thomas Meaney*

In the 1990 justly infamous article, *Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War*, the American strategist John Mearsheimer advised Washington to keep the West’s confrontation with Russia for as long as possible. He correctly predicted that there would be more violence in Europe over the ten years after the Soviet withdrawal from Europe than during the decade before it. With a characteristic provocation, Mearsheimer counseled Washington to *increase* nuclear proliferation in Europe, and force any newly unified Germany to adopt weapons of mass destruction as soon as possible. Mearsheimer assumed that the U.S. forces would soon be coming home from Europe and that American interests required that the balance of power in Europe be maintained as cheaply as possible. And what could be more cost-effective than a few 20-something Germans fulfilling their national service by manning nuclear silos at the Fulda Gap?

Happily, such a scenario never came to pass. There would be no rearmed Germany facing off a beleaguered post-Soviet colossus, with Americans relaxing in the back row of the stadium. Instead Germany—never a state particularly rich in natural resources—continued to go about carving out a sweet spot for itself in the global supply chains. In some ways, Germany’s standing in the 1990s and 2000s could be thought of as a very advanced version of China’s: Germany made the machines that made tee-shirts in Guandong. Russia, meanwhile, had no place for itself to carve out in the global economy. So, Moscow simply doubled down on the natural resources that had been the mainstay of the Soviet economy in its death throes. Oil, natural gas, timber and other commodities were now run by private or semi-privatized firms that no longer considered themselves to be socially responsible. Run in part by an oligarchic “new class,” they did their best to mimic Wall Street orthodoxies in increasing the shareholder value.

In terms of any foreseeable military confrontation between the EU and Russia, it is hard to spot anything remotely as volatile as the Chinese-U.S. confrontation over Taiwan, which the U.S. Navy no longer can defend. In the wake of Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine, Moscow’s record
has been fairly weak in Eastern Europe. The so-called Montenegrin coup plot of 2016 failed badly. The alleged Russian attempt to off-road the “Name Dispute” between Skopje and Athens also failed badly. Most of Russia’s main “victories” have been symbolic: Putin dancing at the wedding of the Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl was a case in point—Vienna has done almost nothing to increase Russia’s actual standing in Europe, much less relieve it of sanctions or other forms of economic warfare. Understanding the power of the symbolic, the group that brought down Heinz-Christian Strache in Vienna with the “Ibiza video” realized that it was enough to invoke simply “Russia” in order to effect a kind of regime upheaval that has so far eluded the actual Russia. Just as Russia today benefits from the “Red bequests” from the Soviet period (such as a vast stock of public housing), so does it benefit from its Cold War reputation for intrepidness. The Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. election almost certainly did not affect the result, but the fact that it was “Russia” doing the meddling ignited national hysteria, in a way that Chinese cyberwarfare has yet to do.

I do not see how any future Russian incursion into the Baltics, on whatever pretext, could not but backfire on Moscow. Trump’s NATO exercises in the Baltics should underline the already obvious: any Russian incursion that far north would be a gift to any American president because it is a confrontation the West would handily win. Putin likely understands this. It would be even more curious if Moscow exercises a greater de facto control over an area like Transnistria. One can easily imagine the result: a lot of EU hand-ringing calls about human rights violations followed by acquiescence. No one in Europe seems to care about Russia’s meddling in countries whose accession into the European Union Brussels itself would prefer not to contemplate. EU accession processes for Albania and North Macedonia, recently discussed by Donald Tusk, are much more likely to be slowed by forces within the EU itself rather than Moscow.

I will leave the big question of Ukraine aside and raise two smaller concerns. First, Moscow need not be aggravated by talk about “forming a real European army.” Discussions about a European army arouse very little real passion in Europe. No one actually thinks it will happen. Even the Germans understand well enough that Macron needs to be fed an occasional bone, so they indulge his ideas, and some of their own. If such an army ever appeared, you can bet Heckler & Koch would seize the day and supply the EU infantry with HK 146s, which the French army has already made its standard issue. When one considers the largest
European military deployments at present, few are in any way directed at Russia. One of the largest—Operation Barkhane—is mostly made up of a French force of around 3,500 troops in the Sahel to manage the repercussions of the post-Gadaffi chaos in North Africa. In the nightmares of Brussels, the monster is the face of an African migrant, not the gun of a Russian tank.

The protests taking place across Europe on Fridays (“Fridays for Future”) are no laughing matter, geopolitically speaking. Perhaps Vladislav Surkov could embark on a Russian foreign policy doctrine that includes the protection of the Russian natural environment as a central priority. In a world where moral and social values are changing at a much faster rate than before, it may be worth considering that the U.S. and Europe and China may all one day compete over who can provide the best and cleanest natural environment to their citizens. Today it is hard to believe it will happen, but it is hardly impossible. The Green New Deal of U.S. Democrats may not have viable prospects in the U.S. Congress, and the German Greens may have long ago transferred their passion away from environmental radicalism towards electric cars, but the Greens wave in Europe is currently a morally righteous force far more potent than religion, and not incompatible, at least in theory, with new forms of militarism. The most radical elements of the European Right are well on their way to greening their visions of Heimat. And it should be remembered that in Beijing, the very same grand strategist who coined the term ‘Chinese Dream’ also drafted a “green” policy agenda for China back in the early 2000s. In such a world, how will Russia fare? The pillaging of the environment under Putin has been mirrored in Erdoğan’s razing of the Turkish forests. So, the question, however naïve or futuristic it may sound, is this: When will the impatience with Green-speak start to cost the Kremlin in geopolitical terms?
The Climate Gamble: 
Poland’s Energy Sector at the Crossroads

Weronika Książek

When European Union executives talk about relations with Russia, they invariably come to one issue—the energy sector. And even if we look twenty years ahead, energy will still stand out as a thread linking the EU and Russia.

This article was written on the eve of the European parliamentary elections and in the run-up to parliamentary elections in Poland in the fall of 2019. The results of the Polish elections will certainly influence the adoption of an official climate strategy that Poland will live by in the near future. While the Chernobyl miniseries is breaking records for HBO, Poland must face 21st century conundrums. No one has any doubts about the importance of complying with the demand for decarbonization, even if it brings problems to some EU economies. Yet the methods of attaining the goal remain an open issue.

For the first time ever, climate problems have entered the agenda of an election campaign on the shores of the Vistula river. Polish scientists and ecologists continue to hear that Germany, which has declared a full renunciation of nuclear power by 2022 and coal by 2038, is an example to follow. However, Germany, a country that has focused on renewable sources of energy and natural gas, is a key partner of Russia in the Nord Stream II gas pipeline project. Today both ecologists and political scientists willingly discuss this topic in order to prove that we need a response to the Nord Stream II from Eastern European countries. The Americans have joined in the game, too, in the hope of bringing their liquefied natural gas to the European market. The U.S. has already tapped fertile ground in Poland that is responsive to the word ‘diversification:’ the LNG sea terminal in Swinoujscie is being expanded and there are plans to launch a floating terminal in Gdansk by 2025. So, contrary to the position aired at the COP climate forum in Katowice last year, it looks like Poland will yield to pressure from the EU and close its coalmines, opting for a mix of renewable energy plus imported fossil fuels and biomass.

Another trend in the current discussions is a pronuclear option. Linked to several associations opposed to the government, supporters...
of nuclear energy are becoming increasingly outspoken. Polish pronuclear environmentalists and scientists are calling on the German government to assimilate efficient technologies of storing the energy derived from renewable sources. “Rejection of nuclear power with low level emissions and full renunciation of coal and lignite burning in the short term seriously complicates the overcoming of technical and technological problems and forces the use of other types of fossil fuels, of which natural gas tops the chart. This, in turn, does not bring the desired results in the form of effective and fast-track decarbonization,” the authors of the petition indicate.

This de facto reflects the discussions taking place inside the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN consultative agency. The IPCC does not conduct research on its own. It relies on the works published in scientific journals. Consequently, its reports sometimes contain the position suggesting that nuclear power is needed to meet the tasks set in the Paris Agreement.

The pronuclear position was openly presented by the ultra-left committee Lewica Razem during the latest European Parliament election campaign. Other politicians either lack an understanding of this issue or else speak conscientiously for an opposite version (like the Green Party). Supporters of nuclear energy from the recently organized Fota4Climate foundation, including Adam Błażowski, a businessman operating in the sphere of energy efficiency, claim that “one megawatt is not equal to another megawatt.” Błażowski indicates that comparing the power of renewable resources with the power produced by a coal-fired or nuclear plant is akin to comparing different types of transport solely from the point of view of their maximum speed. “Western Europe IS NOT moving away from nuclear power because it simply cannot do so, and climate is the reason for this. Germany has not made any progress in the reduction of CO2 emissions since 2009, as it is replacing clean nuclear power with a mix of alternative energy and carbon-based natural gas.”

Renewable energy is viewed as a priority, yet coal-fired plants that are giving way to it are still burning coal to support accessibility. The construction of nuclear power plants is underway in the UK and France. France went back on Macron’s pre-election declarations and will not reduce the share of nuclear power to 50 percent of the energy mix. New nuclear plants will be built in Finland (after the completion of Olikiluoto 3, which is behind schedule), the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia. Błażowski also notes Sweden’s decision to revoke the “nuclear tax.” The Swedish government has approved the construction of new nuclear reactors when they are required to replace old ones.
(which provide up to 50 percent of clean electric power, with the other 50 percent coming from hydroelectric plants; that is, Sweden has fully decarbonized its power-generating industry.)

The proponents of nuclear energy draw a parallel with the less expensive, and less enduring, washing machine as an investment asset necessary for every household. They say renewable energy serves as an inexpensive washing machine, while expensive nuclear energy, which demands much sacrifice, is usually placed at the opposite end of the scale.

Nuclear energy supporters agree with the proponents of the mix option in one thing, namely, that every coal-fired plant in Europe releases 100 times more emissions than an operational nuclear power plant. The burning of coal causes the deaths of 22,000 people in Europe annually. But even here the arguments of the two groups take different tracks. The pronuclear camp nods at Canada instead of Berlin. “The emissions caused by renewable sources in Germany are bigger by a factor of 18 than the emissions caused by the nuclear and renewable sources in Ontario,” writes another leading activist of Fota4Climate movement, Andre Gasiorowski. He points to Rauli Partanen’s work *Climate Gamble: Is Anti-Nuclear Activism Endangering Our Future?* and argues that the author is right in saying that Ontario sets an example that is hushed up in international debates on mitigating the impact of climate change. Why? Because Ontario has shown that nuclear power helps to decarbonize the energy sector profoundly and without unnecessary discussions. In Germany, windmills are spinning, solar panels are functioning, and traditional use of biomass (chipped wood pressed into pellets) continues. Yet the volume of emissions remains large. In this context, the established capacity of windmills and solar panels deserves special attention. One can easily see there is a huge margin of unused capacity. Ontario is an enormous nuclear industry belt, with 19 grams of CO₂/1 kWh efficiency. In Germany, it is 342 grams of CO₂/1 kWh. Gasiorowski says these are powerful facts that cannot be argued by any political narratives.

The average annual temperature in Poland is expected to increase by almost one degree Celsius over the next two decades, while the sea level will rise by more than 20 centimeters. This data comes from the Polish Institute of Meteorology and Water Management, which offers a much more optimistic scenario than the ICPP does. Nonetheless, Poland will need about 170 terawatt-hours of electricity a year. Alongside growing decarbonization, as well as electrification of transport and heating systems, this parameter will increase considerably, in spite of the huge progress made in energy efficiency. Mitigation of the effects of
climate change and adapting to it are key problems the world will face in the upcoming years. In order to reduce the scale of global warming, we should start using energy frugally. Most importantly, the change in approaches should have taken place yesterday. We are not in a position to wait for twenty years until the investments we are making in the energy sector today pay back.

As a consequence, the majority of EU member-states (except for those that have already built their own nuclear industries, like France) will most probably opt for natural gas. And what about Poland? Its hesitations over the choice of options will obviously continue for some time. The incumbent government has adopted a strategy that can be characterized briefly as “bits of everything.” Coal will yield 60 percent of electricity by 2030 and less than 30 percent by 2040. Nuclear power and natural gas will play the role of transition fuels. The country will renounce construction of windfarms on the ground and build them in the sea. These are the guidelines of a draft state energy policy through 2040. As for the use of nuclear power, the government has not passed a definitive decision on it yet, but the Energy Ministry plans to launch the first N-power generating unit in 2033 and, subsequently, one unit every two years until 2043. Each will have the capacity of about 1.0 GW to 1.5 GW, all totaling 6.0 GW to 9.0 GW.

Changes are also forthcoming in the heating market. Future governments will have to introduce a new model for the market of heat supply and a new rate-setting policy, as well as search for stimuli to optimize the costs. Regions that do not have heating networks will face the challenge of attaining the lowest possible emissions, which means that priority will be given to gas, thermal pumps, electric heating, and only then solid fuels.

The scenarios that the IPCC has drawn up for the near future show that the median share of nuclear power in primary energy production in 2050 is 4.2 percent and the forecast share of renewable energy is 60.8 percent. As for electric power generation, the relevant figures are 8.9 percent and 77.5 percent. Therefore, it is clear that the IPCC considers renewable energy as the main source and nuclear power as a supplementary source. Judging from the distribution of mandates in the European Parliament as a result of the elections in May 2019, Europe’s energy policy will be shaped exactly along these lines. Today Europe stands in need of quick and inexpensive solutions. Renewable energy plus gas or biomass offers a solution that will enable the Earth to buy some more time, which, as you know, is the costliest commodity of all.
'Tension' and 'distrust' are the words best used to describe the current state of relations between Russia and the European Union. The reason most likely lies in the failure to incorporate Russia strategically in the international system after the end of the Cold War, and of its neglect in the 1990s and 2000s. Another line of confrontation emerged as a result of the “strategic shock” from the annexation of Crimea. The annexation has deeply damaged the EU-Russia relationship and has eventually led to EU sanctions. Russia’s meddling in the EU elections and the Skripal affair in Salisbury were further negative developments in this regard.

Nevertheless, pragmatic relations with Russia will remain a strategic necessity for the EU, because, as history shows, Europe cannot achieve genuine security if it acts without Russia or against it.

For Austria, Russia is no immediate security problem, analyses do not indicate a direct conventional military threat to Austria. Yet indirectly, a divided and weak in action European Union indeed poses a security challenge for Austria. Importantly, the EU’s weakness is promoted by Russia’s anti-Western policy aimed at weakening EU and Western institutions. To stop this trend, EU-Russian relations should be improved in the future. Meanwhile, it is essential for Europe to strengthen its resilience in order to hold back Russia’s hybrid influence and to be able to reshape relations from the position of strength.

Generally, the most likely scenario for the EU will be a continued focus on governance and internal politics, even with further reinforcement of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Despite the currently severely impaired relations with Russia, the strategic security situation in Europe also holds new opportunities for cooperation, especially with regard to the Southern Crisis Arc around Europe, where stabilization will be hard to achieve without Russia and where cooperation should be beneficial to both sides.

Two key factors are crucial for future EU-Russia relations: the state of Russia-U.S. relations and Russia’s internal stability and development. The European Union has little influence on both these factors.
So, will we see light at the end of tunnel? Yes, if we focus on a positive partnership and fruitful cooperation. What are the ways to achieve this? First of all, Russia and the EU must come to mutual recognition of their structural differences and divergent interests. If this approach is augmented by a mutual understanding that further military escalation and armaments build-up will not benefit either side, the following areas may become common priorities in the future:

- New agreements on conventional and nuclear weapons control, as well as on cyberweapons;
- A new regime of confidence- and security-building measures with a special focus on avoiding unintended escalations, for example, as a result of military exercises, aircraft operations or intelligence activities;
- De-escalation in Ukraine through the implementation of the Minsk Accords;
- A focus on common and real security challenges, in particular terrorism and instability in the Middle East, and building mutually advantageous relations with China;
- Gradual development of a mutually beneficial “modernization partnership” with a focus on economic and scientific cooperation;
- In the long-term perspective, building a new pan-European security architecture with Russia’s participation.

To make these perspectives a reality, it is necessary to focus on the role of the younger generation. In 2036, new young minds will come to replace current political actors in both Russia and the EU. Their political ideas will shape the security environment of the future. So today we should start to consider their ability and willingness to take their counterparts as a key factor of EU-Russia security relations.

That is why exchange programs for students and professionals are becoming ever more important. These programs should be continued on both the academic and official levels and, ideally, be jointly developed by European and Russian experts to avoid notions of mistrust or attempts of harmful influence in the future. This would be one small and concrete, but powerful step towards contributing to a better strategic understanding between the EU and Russia in the long term.
Russia and Another “Abduction of Europa”

Igor Okunev

In making any expert forecast, including that of future relations between Russia and the European Union, two strategies of analysis are possible.

One is the extrapolation of current trends to a prolonged period of time. Regrettably, current trends in Russian-European relations evoke no optimism. If they proceed in the same direction in the mid-term, we are most likely to expect greater mutual enmity and misunderstanding. For a long time there was a hope that the new generation of European elites (administrative and intellectual), free from the ideological blinders of bipolar confrontation in the Cold War era, would be able to overcome traditional stereotypes about Russia as an aggressive and unpredictable neighbor and find a space for a mutually beneficial dialogue in the interests of warding off common global threats. Paradoxically, this new generation appears to be less rational and even more ideologized than the old one. Moreover, the rather vague capitalist ideology is giving way to a very strict ideology of narrowly understood leftist liberalism. In a situation like this the reemergence of conservative values in Russia, apparently inevitable after decades of leftist bias, continues to widen the ideological gap between Russia and the West, leaving little hope for change in the mid-term, if at all.

At the same time, apparently, it would be wrong to interpret the European vector of Russian foreign policy as a linear process with just one pole of attraction. The Russian policy on this track is certainly cyclical and depends on fluctuations in national identity. During one cycle Russia recalls that it is not Europe, or, possibly, that it is even an anti-Europe, and it begins to distance itself from the Old World, quarrelling with it and generating antagonistic values. But as Russia’s spatial identity is essentially dual, at a certain point it says to itself it is genuinely European and should be together with the continent, or possibly, be part of its vanguard. Then it hurries into Europe again, promptly borrows everything Western, and cloaks itself in European clothes. This enchantment does not last long, though, ending the moment Russia realizes that it is not welcome in Europe as an equal. Then Russia remembers once again that it is not quite Western, or
possibly that it is not Western at all, and the cycle of Russian foreign policy enters a new spiral of isolationism. Today we seem to be at the peak of the anti-Western spiral, which merely means that Russia will soon start plotting another ideological “Abduction of Europa.”

The other analytical strategy is based on the analysis of risks to preserve current trends and determine the factors that can replace them. In this sense both Russia and Europe have entered a period of considerable turbulence. The way I see it, the world is pretty fed up with professional politicians. With the current access to enormous information flows as it is, people no longer regard politics as a profession in its own right. We are on the threshold of a global political revolution. Direct and open political regimes will replace representative democracy. The latest presidential elections in the United States, France, and Ukraine are in fact the first manifestations of this phenomenon. How successful Russia and Europe will be in adjusting themselves to such considerable transformations is anyone’s guess. The European system is in a permanent crisis, but this is what makes it strong—it has learned to adjust itself to the most complicated social and political challenges. The Russian system is stable, but this is also one of its weaknesses—it is inert and unprepared for rapid changes in the public mind.

The abovesaid prompts a trivial conclusion (however unprofessional it may sound): our ability to predict the future of Russian-European relations leaves much to be desired. One thing is clear, though—relations will not be boring!
The EU and Russia: Rescue of the Drowning Is Common Concern

Katrina Ilyinskaya

The EU is flourishing. The UK has rethought its departure plans and stayed, and Russia has good-neighborly and economically beneficial relations with Europe—such is the picture I would like to see in twenty years’ time. Sadly enough, today there is no reason to hope a scenario of this kind is possible.

The persistent toughening of sanctions and unpredictability of the leaders of Russia, the U.S. and the UK make one believe that the hardest times are still ahead. Nationalistic sentiments have overwhelmed Europe and are impeding the implementation of the great idea of a united Europe. Views of the EU member-states are getting increasingly difficult to harmonize and one gets an impression that the EU simply does not have a common vision, a strategy or even tentative guidelines for future development.

Poverty and inequality

I am confident that the root cause of the turmoil are commonplace poverty and inequality, and this is true of both poor and wealthy countries. The wealth gap has already borne fruit in my native Latvia: 25 percent of the people aged 30 to 40 have left the country over the last twenty years. Change of the place of residence is tantamount to voting against corruption and a system that cannot be reformed. Emigration of working-age population is the best form of protest—it does not crush people’s lives or cause civil war, arrests or other outrages. It has become increasingly difficult to bring Europeans together for a rally or a protest meeting, despite the availability of modern communication technology. People have become self-contained and feel quite satisfied with contacts in the Internet. Getting rich is no longer an objective for the young generation, as fewer and fewer young people are keen to buy apartments, cars, and similar things. Everyone realizes the need for change, but few are ready to stand up and protest. Changing a system requires the will of the
masses and time, while changing one’s habitat only takes an air flight to a different country. The growing inequality deprives young people of motivation, of love for their homeland that would make them stay and act. Engaging in politics is non-prestigious because you cannot earn money here by fair means. No one has any reason to go against the stream or to put one’s future and family at risk.

A similar situation is observed in other Central European and East European countries, too. The EU authorities voice displeasure with the development trends in these countries, and rich EU nations protest—by introducing various market protection mechanisms, that is, resorting to protectionism. A peculiar situation is taking shape. On the one hand, the most developed European nations would like to resolve their workforce problems by drawing in people from East-European EU countries and potential EU member-states, like Ukraine and Turkey. On the other hand, each country introduces more and more regulations to protect local markets. This policy runs against the European idea of trade association.

Besides, the EU is not only an economic but also a political entity; however, there is no accord between its member-states on political issues. Neither can they agree on strategic economic issues, for instance, those concerning the energy sector. With the UK’s pullout, the situation will only deteriorate and the crisis will deepen unless some urgent decisions are taken. Naturally, this will not happen overnight, so there is still time to recover.

**Life after Putin**

Relations between the EU and Russia will largely depend on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy in the coming four and a half years, that is, until the next presidential election in Russia. For the EU-Russia relations to start improving, Mr. Putin must become “correct” and “convenient” for Western leaders to deal with, and, ideally, return Crimea to Ukraine. However, there are no reasons to imagine this happen.

Life after 2024 looks even more obscure. Will Russia be prepared for the change of its leader? Is the world prepared for it? What will happen to the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet republics? Will Ramzan Kadyrov vow allegiance to the next Russian president or will there be the risk of a third Chechen war? Negative answers to these
questions may bring further discord in Russian society and this, in turn, may prompt the authorities to seek other means of demonstrating power, since imperial mentality will hardly go. If Vladimir Zelensky’s election in Ukraine triggers much-awaited reforms and brings convincing results, then young Russians may show a stronger will for reform. But even election of a young leader with a different mindset does not guarantee success. Russia is ruled by military-security structures which suppress all attempts of public protest, to say nothing of the change of power.

Big brothers

External factors and the interests of other major powers, like the U.S. and China, will be no less important in twenty years’ time. The United States, the EU’s main strategic partner, exerts huge influence on the EU and its policies. Regardless of who is at the helm of power in Washington, the EU will maintain this partnership and heed Washington’s advice. In a bid to attain its own (not the EU’s) geopolitical objectives, America dictates to European countries what sanctions they should introduce and what cooperation projects they should drop, which ignites ever more new conflicts inside Europe. Chinese interests in the EU are ambiguous, too. By gathering into one group 16 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the “16+1” initiative for investment, transport and finance), China has started to implement its geopolitical goal of conquering the European markets to secure the sale of its products. It is rather difficult for the “16+1” format countries to renounce Chinese investments, especially as companies from “Old Europe” invest in these countries reluctantly.

These are just the most obvious factors that currently obstruct improvement of the relations between Russia and the EU. My strong desire is to see the EU united, Russia getting stronger and the two parties becoming good friends in twenty years’ time. The only possible way to achieve that is to reorient their approaches from political priorities to the economic ones, especially in what concerns the solution of global problems, such as environmental protection that is crucial for humankind. If Russia and the EU succeed in streamlining trade by gradually lifting sanctions that have not brought the expected results, political and military maneuvers would move into the background. Russia, too, should revise its approaches and find different ways to assert itself rather than conquer new territories. Why should Russia
need new territories when it cannot ensure decent living standards in its own land?

And how can we build up dialogue? History teaches us there is no other way to begin talks than to hold meetings and discussions. If the most influential people of the meet at one negotiating table, the way it was done in Yalta, and draw a common roadmap into the future, twenty years from now we could speak about strengthening economic ties and cultural values, not about how to ward off a war. Regrettably, right now the future of Russia-EU relations looks more like a rift of global scale.
Trust Is the Only Clue

Anastasia Pogorelskaya

Given the high degree of turbulence in current world politics, it is difficult to predict what will happen over the next five to ten years, let alone in the longer term. It should be remembered, though, that many historically important political events and decisions did not take place in the blink of an eye. A number of objective and subjective prerequisites were behind each development. In this connection, it is worth thinking about what is possible and desirable in future relations between Russia and the European Union and what should be done now to translate this vision into reality.

Deadlock

Today relations between Russia and the European Union have sunk to a record low. In fact, they have reached a deadlock. The main official reason for this is the conflicting interpretation of the 2014 events in Ukraine and their effects. The crisis does not mean, of course, that all relations are frozen: many industrial dialogues have been put on hold, but EU restrictions concern mostly financial and economic relations, while Russia’s retaliatory measures involve the import of food and farm produce.

Established restrictions on cooperation in certain areas are not the main problem, though. It is far worse that both sides lack a relevant and clear strategy of how to develop relations. Waiting for the implementation of the Minsk Accords may be tantamount to a sheer waste of time (the most important resource in world politics). Russia and the European Union might focus on crucial issues of cooperation immediately without linking them to changes of the situation in Ukraine.

On the one hand, it makes little sense to scare each other with further sanctions. Yet, on the other, in the current situation no constructive solution within the framework of the established paradigm of Russia-EU relations is anywhere in sight. It has to be recognized that relations require a conceptual revision, but neither side has managed to propose anything sensible to be done along these lines.
**Crisis of trust**

In the context of Russia’s relations with the EU, trust implies not only certainty about the sincerity of the other side’s foreign policy intentions, but also proper evaluation of each other’s actions and position regarding any issue of world politics. Sadly, nothing of the sort is anywhere in sight. One of the indications of sound relations between Russia and the European Union must be a situation where neither side is permanently on guard against deceit and where any development that may be fraught with potential risks for the region or beyond is instantly blamed on the other side.

Cold War stereotypes still govern Europe’s public opinion of Russia and its foreign policy. Moreover, the EU considers the situation around Crimea and Ukraine, which is the root cause of the current crisis, as a violation of international law. In its scheme of things leaving Russia unpunished would be tantamount to the appeasement of an aggressor. The specter of the Munich Agreement is still haunting Europe, and is dictating decisions and emotions.

In addition, during the Cold War masses of the population developed quite stable stereotypes. Whereas amid pro-Western sentiments in Russia in the 1990s the image of the West and Europe considerably improved, from the standpoint of creating its own moral and political image Russia lost a great deal, failing to realize on time how important it was and failing to change its image in a consistent and competent manner. As a result, today even progressive young people in European universities consciously or subconsciously regard Russia as the Evil Empire threatening flawless Western values, including democracy.

**The matter of reputation**

In order to develop long-term pragmatic relations with the European Union, it is most desirable and important to systemically improve Russia’s image in the world. The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept mentions the use of “soft power” as one of Russia’s foreign policy tasks and the use of the media as a tool to influence world public opinion of Russian foreign policy. It should be remembered, however, that Joseph Nye wrote that “soft power is hard to use, easy to lose and costly to regain.” Therefore, it is necessary to use “soft power” already now in order to convince the European Union that Russia is able and willing to be an equal partner, that it is advantageous for the EU to have mutually beneficial relations
with it, and, most importantly, that Russia’s interests should be taken into account for the good of the entire region.

It might be entirely reasonable to use the European Union’s own experience of wielding “soft power.” The EU has for a long time conducted a vast information campaign to explain its competences, institutions, and activity and also promote its principles and values. For instance, the implementation of the Tempus-Tasis project enabled the EU to not just encourage reform of the universities in the former Soviet republics, including Russia, but also to inform the population on a wide scale about its principles and rules and also to achieve loyalty among those who sincerely share its values and ideas of partnership with the EU. Of great importance to promoting European values among young people is the EU-funded program for academic exchanges Erasmus+. The students to whom the program offered a chance to study in Europe are far more loyal to European citizens and the EU in general.

Russia should start making such investments in its reputation already now in order to ensure that from 2036 and beyond conditions will be created that are necessary to establish friendly relations with the EU. Indeed, this will require financial costs, while the results will become tangible only in the long term. Nevertheless, the development of contacts promotes not just a better understanding of each other, but also trust. Only with mutual trust the two sides can be sure that their interests will be taken into account by the other side in conducting its policies.

Of course, it is highly desirable to see that not only relations of trust are established by 2036, but also their effects, such as the lifting of mutual sanctions, growth in trade, and eventually qualitative changes in its structure, the easing of visa rules, etc. Today Russia is of interest to the EU as a supplier of natural resources, in particular, natural gas. The European Union is of interest to Russia as a provider of machinery and equipment, as well as finished products. It remains to be seen whether they will make mutual investment and launch joint research projects in the future. This is quite possible provided a favorable economic situation is created and trust between the two sides is established.

**More parameters of Europe’s future**

As is well-known, Crimea’s reunification with Russia, which the EU interpreted as a violation of international law, is the main factor for the...
cooler relations between Russia and the EU. However, the European Union is so sensitive about self-determination and the inviolability of sovereignty not because it is a champion of justice and law; rather, its internal problems are the real reason. Inside the European Union, there are certain centrifugal trends that gain momentum during crises. The Crimea referendum with the net effect of a decision to separate, may serve as a precedent (should it be recognized by the European Union) for the self-determination of some ethnic communities and territories inside the European Union. In this connection, Brussels has refrained from fast-tracking Serbia’s accession and insists on the final settlement of its relations with Kosovo in order to avoid setting a precedent inside the European Union.

However, situations similar to those in Kosovo or Crimea may occur at any moment. In order to avoid such crises in the region, and also for the purpose of long-term stabilization of relations between Russia and the European Union, it is essential to begin negotiations without delay and establish international rules of how the right to self-determination can be implemented legally, in particular, when a certain entity wishes to secede from the state of which it is part. As soon as the discussion of some universally recognized rules produces a consensus, the sides will be able to defuse and prevent many potentially dangerous situations in the region. However, to achieve the identified goal at least two conditions will have to be met: firstly, the rules must be considered as an abstraction, without discussing a specific crisis; and, secondly, this must be done in a friendly atmosphere without mutual accusations. If Russia uses its “soft power” skillfully enough, it may positively influence the outcome of such negotiations.

The differences with Ukraine can be resolved in the long term not just by concluding peace, but by building a modern state ruled by law. Only in this case will the region bordering the EU and Russian see a lasting peace. Moreover, this will allow them to focus on mutually beneficial cooperation and joint efforts to address other issues. Regrettably, in the current situation there is no chance to expect that the EU’s or Russia’s influence will be able to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. Consequently, it may well be frozen for a long time, up to 2036. True, this option will benefit neither side, but until a comprehensive solution is found it will hardly be possible to expect a long-term qualitative change in the situation.

The U.S. stance is another factor that will influence Russia’s relations with the European Union. If remained unchanged, Washington’s
current policies may cause a still worse cooling off in relations with the EU, specifically, if Britain eventually leaves the European Union. Cooler relations with the United States may bring about a situation where the EU and Russia will find it much easier to cooperate, because there will be less need to take into account U.S. interests in the region. It is possible that by 2036 the European Union will eventually build up the resources and political will to ease the peg of its foreign policy to that of the U.S. In that case rapprochement with Russia will become more likely. If the EU’s foreign policy remains an identical twin of the U.S., then the risk of further tensions with Russia is large.

The desirable result of Russia-EU relations by 2036 should be the establishment of mutual trust. Then the partners should be able to launch and expand trade, economic, financial, and other types of cooperation.
Gentle Europe in the Year of the Fire Dragon

Natalya Pomozova

In today’s world of incessant turbulence, it is hard to forecast anything, even several years in advance. However, let us dare try to preview the future of Russia and the European Union with the hope that things will be better.

The awareness that nobody today can come up with an accurate description of what Europe will be like and what kind of relationship it will share with Russia in the long term makes this task quite thrilling and paves the way for the boldest fantasies.

The European Union today is a bowl of unresolved contradictions. On the one hand, there are the traditional ideology and common values, to a large extent imposed by the West, and on the other, major problems, of which migration is the most sensitive of all. Europe no longer wants freedom, equality, and fraternity wherever and whenever they imply the duty to host a tremendous number of refugees, because it is fraught with great economic pressures, soaring crime, and loss of identity. Europe wishes to revise the principles of its democracy and retain the ideals of humanism, but at the same time to adjust them to modern realities. Europe is in search of leaders capable of coping with this difficult task, but so far it has come across only right-of-center populists, who are unable to propose sensible solutions to long-lasting economic problems. However, the degree of discontent with domestic policies is so high that Europeans apparently do not care. Determined to retain their identity, they seem prepared to reconsider the political ideology of the European Union and support parties that were considered marginal until just recently.

The risk that some countries may secede from the European Union by 2036 does exist, but in our opinion the EU will survive under certain circumstances. The main condition of its integrity is whether the leaders of the main countries are prepared to reconsider the democratic basics and adjust them to modern realities. It looks like the right-of-center populists are destined to play a historical role. They will become the preachers of a new European ideology as soon as its principles have been formulated (or most likely have already been formulated) by
political pundits and intellectuals. This ideology will trim “equality and fraternity” to a condition that will make it possible to avoid a catastrophe in Europe.

The task of a new political ideology is to transform the historical French formula in such a way that Western Europe retains the ideals of humanism, organic to the identity of its countries’ peoples. But at the same time the European Union will provide assistance to those in need from other continents in a fashion that would not entail fatal consequences for the European middle class.

The trade unions, which unite the working class and play a noticeable role in European society, will take the side of the right-wingers in pursuit of economic interests. Eager to protect children and guarantee the customary level of security, the women’s movement will be gradually mobilized to restrict and firmly control migration. To say how exactly the basics of Western European democracy will be upgraded is the job of political scientists, but, in our opinion, by 2036 this concept will take a clear shape and begin to be intensively embedded in EU politics with support from the far-right.

The revision of democratic slogans and notions will cause favorable influences on relations between Russia and Europe. The gap between ideologies will be narrowed and the rational groundwork become stronger. By 2036 the Crimean issue will disappear from the European partners’ foreign policy discourse and economic cooperation will gradually return to the previous, pre-sanctions parameters.

It is impossible to forecast the lineup of political forces in the world by 2036 without mentioning the factor of China, which, by that time, will have become the main actor on the world stage. In the process of implementing the concept of the Community of Shared Future for Mankind (or the Community of Common Destiny) and also the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing will not only pose the main threat to the political weight of the alliance of Europe and the United States, but also arouse certain fears in Russia.

The Community of Shared Future for Mankind concept looks lucrative to many countries, but its content is known in fact only to the Chinese leadership (most probably in China, too, it is in the process of a continuous reconsideration). While Beijing will be explaining the rules to everybody, quite a few nuances will surface, the ultimate aim of which is to guarantee China’s world leadership. Nevertheless, amid existing world problems the first real attempt at revising the system of
international relations that emerged after the Cold War has chances to succeed (at least partially).

The economic dependence of many industrializing countries, a firm foothold in the technological sector, and its estimated population by 2036 will enable China to make more convincing attempts to set its own rules of the game on the world political stage. Russia, while trying to preserve an impression of good relations with China, will be on guard against the risk of irreversible economic dependence on Beijing in view of its technological non-competitiveness. Since the European member-countries of NATO are closer to Russia than to China geographically, historically, and culturally, the alliance will tend to seek political rapprochement with Russia. For its part, Russia will benefit a great deal from a chance to demonstrate its proximity to a major partner. Although by virtue of the financial investment proportions, the technological gap between the armed forces of Russia and NATO will grow, this will not hinder the ability of these two antagonists to play the card of greater political rapport, albeit illusionary.

Turbulence is a reality that will be relevant for the world in 2036. For Russia, it is essential to master the skill of maintaining balance and buoyancy in the troubled sea of international politics. The task of Russian diplomacy is to stay on course, without letting its foreign policy vector develop an eastward or westward bias.

The Chinese leadership’s call on the world to use ancient Chinese wisdom as a universal remedy from all of its ills has one great weakness in the civilizational gap between the East and the West. By contrast, Russian wisdom may provide a foothold in these relationships, which are not easy, and help find compromises against the backdrop of snowballing contradictions and the permanent turbulence of world politics.
Power of Global Corporations to Go in Twenty Years’ Time

Agnieszka Piwar

“Pride goes before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall.”
[Proverbs, 16:18]

“Where does the confidence expressed in this title come from?” a reader may ask. There is every indication that the power of major corporations is growing. One could even say that global governance institutions—the UN, unions, NGOs, governments, and big business—constitute one big orchestra of the so-called “participation democracy.” There is an elaborate and unambiguous action program. Christian ethics, the ethics of the natural law suggesting “Do good, avoid evil” has been swept away from the face of the Earth. Traditional cultures are ruining.

The world has succumbed to a new global ethics molded on the absurd concept of man guided exclusively by appetite (gender) and the deviant concept of the right to kill (abortions and euthanasia). To consolidate power, a new type of totalitarianism, a mix of two previous ones (communism and national socialism) has been devised. But like any totalitarian system it will have a finale.

My strong conviction that this will take place stems from my faith in Heavenly Providence and objective historical laws. The history of humankind shows that all great powers fell for the reasons that today prompt a near end of global governance, that is, of the Empire of International Financiers.

In 1976, Sir John Bagot Glubb, a highly honored British officer, published an article titled “The Fate of Empires” in Blackwood’s Magazine, in which he presented a mechanism of the rise and fall of great powers. Glubb made a meticulous study of the history of all known empires crafted by the human hand over the past 3,000 years—from Assyria to Persia to Rome to the Ottomans to the British Empire—and discovered an amazing regularity. It suggests that decadence is ensuant on an excessively long period of the reign of wealth and power aggravated by egotism, thirst for money, and loss of the sense of duty. Decay goes hand-in-glove with the degeneration of morality, a surge...
of materialism and consumerism, libertinism, the inflow of foreigners, passivity, pessimism, overblown governmental care, a growth of bureaucracy, degradation of the family, enfeebling of religion, collapse of traditions, etc.

Remarkably, during the period of decay males become weak and run into self-identity problems (recall fashion shows, music festivals of the Eurovision type, etc.). At the same time, the role of women in society grows and they begin to take on typically male duties. These phenomena are the consequences, rather than causes, of decay. Sir John Glubb notes a peculiar fact: “The heroes of declining nations are always the same—the athlete, the singer or the actor. The word ‘celebrity’ is used to designate a comedian or a football player, not a statesman, a general, or a literary genius.”

The rulers of declining empires typically demonstrate an extremely high degree of ignorance and feel confident that power has fallen into their hands for good. Their subjects (society) cannot count on support from politicians, who are engulfed in internal discords and meaningless debates. So comes the loss of hope as “in time of decadence the citizens no longer make an effort to save anything because they are convinced that nothing is worth saving.”

The signs of decline, which Glubb discovered in the history of past empires, are repeating themselves here and right now with scaring precision. Glubb made his observations public in the 1970s, so he could not possibly know that the factors he described would fit well into the landscape of the second decade of the 21st century. This time all of it is unfolding in the West (the EU, the U.S., etc.) where huge megalopolises perform the functions of the capitals of a huge modern empire.

The author of the “Fate of Empires” did not say a word about global governance by transnational corporations, he focused on the fate of the empires that had vanished. So how can we know that the end of the Empire of International Financiers is close at hand? John Glubb showed that the full cycle from the inception of a state through to the suicide of an empire takes a timespan of ten generations of people, that is, about 250 years.

When I started to ponder what the world may look like in 25 years’ time, I compared today’s developments with those we have learned from history [and they clearly point to a decline]. Then I reached for the calculator to get to the very beginning. If we deduce 250 years from
2039, then we will get straight into 1789, i.e. to the start of the French Revolution that threw the old system into the dustbin of history. And who built the new system then?

Following the end of the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) and the French Revolution (1789-1799), Mayer Amschel Rothschild embarked on a sweeping construction of a new empire on the ashes of the old world. Both events catalyzed the fast growth of his business. At the peak of unfolding opportunities and with fair winds “the father of international finances,” as Forbes magazine called him, sent his five sons on missions abroad. They began the expansion one after another: Nathan Mayer in London, Jacob in Paris, Salomon in Vienna, Kalman in Naples, and Amschel Mayer in Frankfurt-am-Mein.

Since then, international finances have been incessantly exercising control over the world. Today, a total of 189 countries are members of the International Monetary Fund headquartered in Washington. Empires of the past were ruled by Caesars, kings, sultans, and so on. The present-day Empire is ruled by bankers, with politicians playing the role of their procurators. The system of liberal democracy is used as a convenient tool to keep everything under control. And those countries which dare disregard the power of the U.S. dollar will share the plight of Libya and Syria where democracy was introduced under false flags and through the use of force. In order to retain power, the rulers of the global Empire resort to heinous crimes and lawlessness.

Yet soon enough the executers of the project will lose immunity to punishment. And what will happen to us? Who will save and lead us into the future? How will we survive the upcoming World War III? John Glubb had some good news for us: many of the greatest saints lived at a time of decay and it was them who raised the banner of responsibility for humanity and service against depravity and inaction. We must not lose hope. God resurrects the saints and sends His prophets to us. So, let us look around and ask ourselves: Where are they? How can we identify them? What warnings are they sending to us? And, last but not least, what path for us are they pointing at?

Let us stay on alert. The moment when the world of today ruins and a new Empire arises is not far off. We will see and attend its rise.
Values and More
Why Young People in Russia and the European Union See the World Differently

On May 30, 2019, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), jointly with the Russia in Global Affairs magazine and the Russian International Affairs Council, held a roundtable discussion titled “The Young Generation of Russia and the West: How We Understand Each Other.” The meeting came as a logical continuation of the CFDP project “Russia as Seen by a Young Generation of Foreign Leaders” (implemented as part of the grant program “Expanding International Cooperation between Civil Society Institutions” with support of the Russian presidential grant for the development of civil society provided by the Presidential Grant Fund).

The forum was moderated by Fyodor LUKYANOV, Chairman of the CFDP Presidium and Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs. The keynote speakers were: Vera AGYEYEA, Associate Professor at the Department of Applied Political Science, National Research University–Higher School of Economics (St. Petersburg); Dmitry RAZUMOVSKY, Acting Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and Alexander VYSOTSKIY, Administration Officer of the International Cooperation Department, Central Office of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The year 2019 marks the 30th anniversary of the revolutionary events that changed the course of history and set the track for global development up to date. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the communist bloc, and the ensuing developments shaped the mindset of politicians both in Russia and the West for many years ahead.

But today a new generation of people has entered politics. For them, the period of the 1980s-1990s is a historical event rather than a personal experience. The 20th-century generations share a memory of the Cold War and the principles of interaction, which sometimes was quite intensive. Those who are now 25-35 years old have moved along diverging paths and have different views on the starting point (events of 1989-1991), the distance covered, and the prospects lying ahead.
Taking the 30th anniversary of changes in Europe and the world as a starting point, the panelists attempted to answer the following questions:

- What happens to public conscience when generations change?
- How much are young generations, which have grown up without dividing, confrontational walls, in an open world and global environment, alike?
- Do they understand each other? If yes, why is it not so obvious? If not, what steps need to be taken to foster a dialogue?
- Following are the most interesting points made during the discussion.

Why don’t we understand each other well enough despite shared economic, political, energy, and security interests? The main reason is the value gap. While in the early 1990s, Russia and Europe sought to harmonize their values and interests, later Europe focused on the development of the EU area and the fight against terrorism, while Russia prioritized new, more nationalistic, values aimed at protecting its own borders and sovereignty. In fact, this is not at variance with European values; it is just that these were the values that had dominated there until the middle of the 20th century. Some spoke of the so-called “phase lag” not only in Russia but also in Latin American countries.

Values are a changeable and constantly evolving thing. Current European values, formed after the end of World War II, are pacifism, non-use of force, negotiations, and the indisputable priority of human rights and freedom.

So the gap in values between Europe and Russia is part of history. In other words, the current Russian system of values does not contradict historical European values but matches a different period of European development.

On the other hand, today we can see a step backwards in the system of European values, at least among a considerable part of the electorate in some European states which are going back to the nation-state values, sovereignty, border protection and national identity.

The attitude of part of Europe’s young people can be characterized not just as Euroscepticism or anti-European tendencies, but as certain Europessimism. For example, there are interesting EU data concerning international relations. They indicate in particular that two-thirds of
Europeans believe that EU membership is good for their personal life in each of the EU countries. This is the highest level of life satisfaction in the European Union since 1983. On the other hand, about a half of those polled expect the EU’s collapse and disintegration in the near future. And one-third of respondents do not rule out a war between EU member states, which is even more paradoxical since the EU was conceived as a structure that would not allow a war in Europe ever again.

When EU residents are asked what they would lose if the EU fell apart, they name three things. First, everybody notes the positive role of the common market. It is very important from the economic point of view that one can move around, work wherever he wants and sustain no financial losses. The second most popular answer is the EU’s global role. Many people stress that united Europe can play a more important role on the international stage. The third aspect is the question of identity. Thinking of themselves as representatives of a European civilization is very important for Europeans.

It is quite noteworthy that European young people, for some reason, believe in the possibility of war between European countries. For example, 50% of young people in the Netherlands, 46% in France, and 51% in Romania share this point of view. This does not mean by any means, of course, that the young people expect French tanks to roll into Belgium tomorrow. This rather suggests that there is a spirit of conflict and competition between European countries.

Today’s Europe can be sort of divided into two “emotional” parts. The first part is the so-called a Europe of war; the second part is a Europe of peace. The Europe of peace encompasses those who seek to continue the European project and emphasize its positive sides. The Europe of war comprises those who do not believe in a common future and think it would be better for everyone to split up. There are two types of “warriors” within the Europe of war. The first type includes volunteer and satisfied “warriors” who ideologically think that the EU is a bad idea and should be dissolved. But there are also “warriors” against their will who see that politicians are unable to keep the project up to par and it is simply not working.

Experts who study these processes believe that the focus in discussions should be shifted from the logic of peace, persuasion, facts and arguments to the emotions and grammar of war; politicians should show emotionally: We understand you, your fears are justified, and we will overcome them together. A vivid example is environmental
Russia and the World in the Eyes of the New Generation

protection, a field where all disputes have long been finished and there is no need to convince anyone any more. Instead, it is necessary to work towards cohesion, act together, and mobilize society.

On the other hand, public opinion polls conducted in 2013 indicate that there is a difference between how Russian and European young people understand their values. First of all, Russian young people position themselves as more religious. Respondents do not go to church or confess often, but such self-identity exists—they consider themselves religious. Furthermore, Russian young people are more inclined than their Western peers to accumulate wealth and abide by certain moral principles. However they are less open to new knowledge and prospects and less eager to do business.

The latest polls conducted in 2019 reveal disturbing tendencies: about a half of young people in Russia would like to leave the country for good and are considering such a possibility. Modern young people have grown up in a space without borders, they are known as Generation Z. They see themselves, the country and the world differently. So when they talk about moving abroad, they do not mean it as some act of treason against their own country. This makes the understanding of the phenomenon of identity quite relevant in the 21st century. There is no need to choose between being a Frenchman, a European, and a world citizen because there is the term ‘multiple identity’ which allows one to have several identities that do not contradict each other. If a person considers himself a Frenchman, it does not mean that he cannot be a European or a world citizen. A person can accumulate different identities within himself.

Russian young people have a multi-level, multi-tier kind of thinking. At the beginning of the 21st century, there appeared the term ‘global Russian,’ and Russian young people who have grown up in a space without borders, match it perfectly. This means a multi-level identity. A “global Russian” lives and works wherever he wants and thinks as he sees fit, while not losing touch with Russian culture and Russia.

So, the value gap between modern Russian and European young people is closing. It still remains, however, between older generations which were infused with the logic of confrontation at the gene level. Young people are different, especially 18- and 19-year-olds—they are more open to the world and more inclined towards dialogue.

The speakers also noted certain conservatism among a considerable part of Russian young people, their growing interest in religion and
left-wing ideology. On the other hand, while the older generation of Russians had, and still have to a certain extent, the complex of great-powerness, modern young people in Russia have no such predilection in its previous form, maybe just some kind of nostalgia inspired by the stories told by their fathers.

The political maturing of those who are now 35 years old coincided with the Kozyrev period, when Russia, on the one hand, viewed the West as a partner, but on the other hand, saw that its interests were not taken into account in the West as was evidenced by the situation of the Russian-speaking people in the Baltic states and Central Asia, NATO’s eastward expansion, and disregard for Russia’s position on Kosovo. This created certain cognitive dissonance in people’s minds. Later, during Putin’s first presidential term, Russia showed firmness in several situations and became ready to formulate new rules of the game, thus seeking the role of an equal partner. These rules and our interests were consonant with universal human ones.

The generation 30+ began to grasp the meaning of international relations when Putin extended his hand to the West for partnership, when Russia-EU and Russia-NATO summits were held on a regular basis, and Russia and the U.S. joined forces against terrorism. This is why it was so hard for that generation to understand the West’s reaction to Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference. Illusions about a possible equal partnership were shattered when it turned out that the West had never considered Russia an equal partner. As a result, a considerable part of Russian young people began to view the West as an enemy rather than a partner. Active 35-year-old Russians remember how Russia’s good intentions in the 1990s were taken by the West as its weakness.

The speakers noted such an aspect of political culture as understanding and stressed that understanding did not mean the absence of conflict.

The panelists pointed out that only a small portion of Russian young people who traveled abroad on a more or less regular basis communicated with their foreign peers. These are mainly residents of capital and major cities, with a corresponding social circle, way of life and outlook. Apart from Russian young people whose values are similar to those of their Western peers, there are also enough young and ambitious people in government agencies and state-owned companies who are quite adapted to the system, continue the traditions of their
parents and do not look like world citizens at all. The growing inequality in society explains the rise of left-wing and populist sentiments among young people. These socioeconomic disproportions will play a key role in our common future.

Some speakers assessed European young people’s attitudes as a crisis of ideology and rejection of traditional European values which have to be replaced by a new ideology adapted by right-wing parties to present-day challenges facing united Europe. Some assumed that a new ideology would make it easier for Russia to build its dialogue with Europe.

Participants made a point that Russia did not pay enough attention to building a dialogue with China’s Millennials who are very much different from their European and Russian peers. While discussion on how to establish a dialogue between young Europeans and Russians is underway in the Russian intellectual community, there is practically no such discussion with regard to Chinese young people.

Some expressed the view that the value gap was an objective factor; it had always been, was and would most likely remain to a certain extent. Those who lived in the Russian Empire always differed from those who lived in the French or Chinese Empire. Today the value gap with the West is much smaller in all respects. The ability to negotiate an agreement is part of human nature. Otherwise people would not have survived. This is why it would be wrong to say that we are unable to come to agreement because of the value gap. Modern information technologies allow people to find like-minded persons regardless of the borders.

The factor of modern technologies also has another important aspect. There are some technologies the development of which within one country leads to a deeper crisis of confidence: we cannot come to agreement because no one trusts anyone. The more we work on the development of such technologies which seem to be perfect, especially if we consider them perfect, the deeper such mistrust is. This is the paradox of our times: some technologies can be developed only jointly with others, because if it is done by any one country separately from others, this will raise suspicions.

The speakers noted that the ideological and worldview sentiments of Russian and European—especially Central and Eastern European—young people were coming closer together as they tended to support left-wing movements and parties more actively and demanded social justice and dignity more firmly.
Young people aged 25-35 both in Russia and the West grew up in completely different contexts. Presently, most young people are also developing in different contexts (the system of education, its affordability, etc.). Even though the values of young people in Russia and the West are nominally identical, their interpretations differ, which does not help bring them closer together.

Nationalist sentiments are on the rise in Europe, driven by populism, while the world continues to globalize. Different countries and whole regions are moving along similar paths, but with phase lags. Russia and Latin American countries are about a half-cycle behind Europe and North America in assessing global trends, as borne out by the latter’s rejection of economic centrism and by increased attention to environmental issues.

Western partners are unable to understand why the Russian top leadership ignores environmental problems. Public initiatives and efforts for the development of cooperation in this sphere are obviously not enough. However, the “green” activity of Russian urban young people (high school pupils and students) gives hope for environmental cooperation between Russia and the West, which may become the binding thread in the future.

Values are being instrumentalized around the world; they are just “eye-glasses” through which people look at reality. But it seems that young people in Russia and the West use different lenses.

In 1968, youth activity brought tectonic shifts in Europe’s development. In the second decade of the current century, young people in the Middle East had a direct impact not only on political processes in their region but also in Europe. Changes are brewing in European and Russian societies, especially among young people, which can affect civilizational development in the most fundamental way.
Young Europe: Self-Perception

"Concord" (France, Russia, Britain)
A poster, the 1910s
Strategy: Self Comes First

Anna Zhikhareva

The decades of the European integration project have never been free of problems and crises. Yet today the European Union is in such limbo that the risk of disintegration is not just in the air, it is clearly perceptible — Brexit, the sharpening disagreements between the West and East, the North and South, the liberal and conservative forces, the results of the latest elections to the European Parliament, which have shown that agreement will be hard to reach — are all factors that make the future of the EU ever more obscure. Yet the legitimacy of the European Union is primarily based on a vision of a common future (deeper integration, an improved social model, new projects, etc.). The issue of Europe’s future is vital, above all, to those who will be building it, so it is worth looking at the opinions of young people in Europe.

We tried to analyze the Internet rhetoric of the young generation of Europeans — scientists, bloggers, public figures, and simply active users of the Internet.

Our analysis has shown that young politicians and public figures in Europe are unquestionably committed to the “green” agenda. Not a single discussion about common European issues comes without an urge for decarbonization of the economy and transfer to low-carbon technologies.

According to a Eurobarometer 2019 survey, priority issues for young people (aged from 15 to 30 years) in the EU are protection of the environment and controlling climate change. This data is confirmed by one-man and mass student protests. Other priorities include improving education and professional training, and fighting poverty and social inequality. Naturally, mostly young people are worried about climate change, because they will live in the next 30-50 years, while the opportunity for free movement and access to education in any EU-member state mostly worries those who would like to stay in their country of education (Fig.1).

Concern is also high among young people (here they are no different from older citizens) about the increase in migration to Europe. Migration, together with the problem of an aging population over the next two decades, can provoke a powerful demographic crisis. There is
Russia and the World in the Eyes of the New Generation

also a high degree of concern about unemployment: young Europeans doubt that by 2030 they will be able to find a decent high-paying job. Remarkably, there are a number of socially active citizens among young Europeans, those who participate in elections and public initiatives, and engage in volunteer activities. In general, when people have such a proactive attitude, one can be sure about the future. However, things are not that simple. Also, there is a question: Do these people need the European Union as much as previous generations did?

Young Europeans (especially those who are nearing thirty) take for granted the freedom of movement, social benefits, and gender freedoms they have grown up with. In fact, they enjoy a common European culture. At the same time, they bear most the costs of growing inequality, the consequences of the financial crisis, and tend to doubt the panacea of the common market and the European social model. Disillusioned voices are clearly heard, above all, among young people in Central and Eastern Europe where the rightist tendencies remain popular, while turnout at all-European parliamentary elections is low. The locals doubt that their voice means anything to distant Brussels. At the same
time, there are many who call for remaining loyal to the European idea, because without integration “everything could be much worse.”

There is a large percentage of young people among the green left who believe that, despite the waning popularity of the European Union, it is necessary and should be transformed into something new.

The green left agenda justifies the need for a United Europe to address the major social challenges of the twenty-first century: growing inequality, climate change, and migration. These challenges cannot be overcome within the framework of a national policy. Frequent floods, temperature fluctuations, droughts, fires, and storms of unprecedented intensity are among the increasingly frequent manifestations of climate change. All of this could trigger new waves of migration and a deepening crisis of inequality. As they say, during a disaster, not everyone is in the same boat. Like in the movie Titanic, there are always more lifeboats for the first-class passengers. Thus, the rhetoric of the green left smoothly combines two big ideas: measures to combat climate change and social injustice. And these ideas are very popular among the youngest Europeans.

There has been a lot of talk about “dying democracy,” but it seems the Internet-active, non-partisan young Europeans are not ready to put up with it. Judging by Twitter, the theme of the future of Europe occupies a special place in public discussion among students, bloggers, and young professionals. The general discourse is very positive: “Let’s preserve democracy;” “Europe should be united;” “Common problems—common solutions.” That is, young people believe that the emphasis should be shifted to global problems that require a pan-European approach, while the problems of national nature should be solved within the countries themselves.

However, surveys conducted among Europeans of different ages have shown that more than half of European citizens think that the EU will disintegrate within one generation (15-20 years). The disintegration is seen as something inevitable rather than desirable, though. The respondents continue to support the integration project, despite the fact that no special achievements have been recorded for more than a quarter of a century.

At an Internet forum “Future of Europe: What’s the Role for Young People?” there is much debate about what young people can and should do for the future of Europe. They say that their opinion, as that of the most educated and advanced generation of European citizens, should
be considered now, and political and other decisions vital for Europe should be taken with their direct participation.

There are calls for forging solidarity among young people across Europe. They speak of the need for a solid foundation, and a common goal that could encompass the ideas and ideals of young Europeans. To do this, young people need to comply with the EU motto “Unity in diversity” and assert themselves in their common European identity. Then critical issues (the refugee crisis, reforms of the monetary union and the labor market, equality of countries and peoples living in the European Union, climate change and energy security) could be solved effectively. Simply put, if the EU youth think as a single collectivist society, mutual negative attitudes and mistrust will disappear, self-confidence will prevail, and there will be no more disunity. Such romantic comments are very popular on this forum. It is safe to assume, though, that such rhetoric is characteristic of urban residents, while rural residents are mostly concerned about environmental problems and unemployment, and their solution is believed to be in the hands of the national state, not the EU.

The bottom line is that, first of all, we must understand that fifteen- and thirty-year-olds are completely different in their way of thinking and experience. The main thing they have in common is the focus on common intra-European problems and ways to solve them. The role of the EU as a global political and economic player remains on the periphery of public consciousness. In this regard, it is not easy to imagine what young Europeans think about the prospects of, for example, Russian-European relations. It is clear only that before establishing relations with other countries, they need to understand each other. And the younger generation understands this very well.
Green and Flat?
The Future of the World through the Eyes of Young Germans

Yevgenia Prokopchuk

What will the European Union look like by 2035? What kind of Europe will future generations of political leaders be destined to govern? Very few will dare forecast today what the EU will be like in fifteen years from now. The modern world is highly volatile. Now and then “black swans” change the domestic and foreign political landscape in an instant. Societies undergo in-depth transformations induced by the new technological, information and social setup.

The European Union’s development vector will largely depend on Germany, the engine of the European economy and integration. Europe in general and Germany in particular are at a crossroads. Strained relations with the United States, the migration crisis, the rise of populism, climate change, and China’s economic boom push relations with Russia into the background.

HOW DO YOUNG GERMANS SEE THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND THEIR OWN COUNTRY?

To answer this question, it is essential to take a look at the entire spectrum of political trends in Germany and to analyze which of them evoke the greatest response from the younger generation.

The defeat of traditional political parties in the elections to the European Parliament on May 23–26 was the most resounding event in the EU’s political life. The electorate gave preference to the leftist liberal forces and the Greens, with the latter scoring the highest points in Germany, France and Britain.

It is noteworthy that the populist parties that had been regarded as the main threat were not equally successful: support for them was the greatest in Hungary (Fidesz—52.3%), Italy (League—33.6%), and France (National Rally—23.5%). Germany is in tenth place (Alternative for Germany—10.8%). The Alternative for Germany party had hoped for a better result, but scandals over financial support from Switzerland...
caused an adverse effect on its popularity ratings. Just as the fact that
the migration agenda had lost its relevance for the Germans in contrast
to the peak registered three to four years ago.

In contrast to the results of the elections held five years ago, the
Greens managed to rake twice as many votes (20.5%). They gained
support from 40% of those who cast their ballots for the first time, while
only 11% of novice voters opted for the CDU-CSU, and 7% for the Social-
Democratic Party of Germany (the SDP).

The trend is quite remarkable, but a closer look at Germany’s
elections with reference to age factor makes it clear that the age group
of 45-60 will continue to determine the political course for quite a while.
The share of young people (under 20) went down in 1950-2017 to 18%
from 30%. By 2060 it is likely to shrink further to 17%. In other words, the
older generation will continue to shape foreign policy in the foreseeable
future. The above data prompts the conclusion that the success of the
Greens in the pan-European election was largely a result of their ability
to persuade the senior generation: in the age group of 45 to 59 one
in four voted for the Greens. Even among the voters aged 60-69 the
Greens got 19%.

However impressive these data may look, it is young people that
largely influenced the outcome of the election in Germany—the younger
generation made the environmental agenda a decisive factor in the

A YouTube REVOLUTION

Several days before the election videoblogger Rezo posted a clip in the
YouTube called Die Zerstoerung der CDU. Although originally the video was
meant for his subscribers only, the clip scored a record 14.8 million views
and 208,000 comments (in just one week the number of views grew by a
factor of 200,000). The video came as a political bombshell. Many public
and political figures expressed support. A few celebrities posted their
video responses. Comments by the German-speaking audience indicate
that there exists a great demand for an unbiased and non-ideologized
political education in society.

“We’ll change henceforth the old tradition…” Rezo’s stunning video
drew a wide response from the German public at large, including the
leaders of the main political parties. Most German-language sources
were unanimous that his video considerably influenced the outcome
of the European Parliament elections. The Rezo phenomenon should be considered with special attention, because he is a representative of the younger generation who have a specific outlook and values. Understanding the problems that worry young Europeans and the way they see their future will be the key factor in the success of the Russian foreign policy on the European track. Also, this particular case shows how the media is changing: the traditional instruments of influence on the public mind begin to fail now and then, while it remains unclear how the new tools work. It is an omen of our time: you can squander mammoth resources on the election campaign only to see its effects instantly vanish into thin air. Finally, the range of highlighted problems and, most importantly, the reaction of the key political players to them have exposed serious challenges to Germany’s political system.

A total of 260 hyperlinks to official documents, media resources, statistics, surveys, etc. were attached to the video.

**Winners and losers.** Rezo began his investigation with a scrutiny of the CDU’s claim that it is a truly popular party addressing the needs of all groups of the population and social strata. Of 36 years of its existence, the CDU has been at the helm of power for 29 years. During this time the gap between the rich and the poor grew wider (Fig. 1a, b, c). Attributing this to the industriousness of some and the lack of diligence in others is wrong: most of the well-off inherited their wealth (Fig. 2). Also, over the past twenty years the tax burden has hit heavier the poor than the rich (Fig. 3). During the CDU rule a whole lot more was done for the wealthy citizens than for the rest. Therefore, the voters think that this is a result of the party’s political course.

![Fig. 1a](image-url)  
*Post-tax national income in Germany (1980-2016)*
The distribution of the aggregate state among the population [by households] in 2014

Fig. 1b

Poverty in Germany and economic development in 2006-2013

Fig. 1c
Rezo has shattered the myth about equal opportunities for all. These days it is widely believed that an individual’s success in life does not depend on his/her background. The problem is that the way up is through education. In Germany, upward social mobility through education is lower than in other industrialized countries (although in all fairness, Russia is number two on this rating list) (Fig. 4).

**Fig. 2**

Stock of inherited wealth, % of total wealth

![Chart showing stock of inherited wealth over time.](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**Fig. 3**

Change in the tax burden in Germany in 2015 compared with 1998

![Chart showing change in tax burden by tax bracket.](https://via.placeholder.com/150)
Climate crisis: to prevent an Apocalypse. Rezo claims that the CDU is ruining people’s lives. A large share of the expert and academic community can provide convincing proof of it. The blogger gives a clear and detailed explanation to the mechanism of global warming (which the audience liked a lot) and provided research data to back up each argument.
The main conclusion is this: humanity burns hydrocarbons, thus provoking climate change. The current policy is not only fraught with grave consequences of global scale but is unbeneﬁcial economically and strategically—the number of disasters and irreparable costs of eliminating their effects are growing ([Fig. 5a, b]). Rezo touched upon the Europeans’ most sensitive point: climate change will trigger a landslide influx of migrants, a worsening of the sanitation and disease situation, and wars for resources. It is not too late to prevent all this, though—a fundamental revision of the political course is needed.

The main problem is the German leadership’s reluctance to change anything. Rezo’s main point of accusation is that the people who make key political decisions lack professionalism. The CDU is not the sole target for his criticism: the author paid enough attention to the Alternative for Germany to show the incompetence of the party’s representatives in the spheres of their responsibility. In the
meantime, the lives of many thousands of people depend on their decisions.

**What is to be done?** To preserve the planet in its current shape it is essential to fast-track transition to ecologically clean energy sources and to stop using coal, oil, and gas. Instead, the government has closed 80,000 jobs in the green energy sector and slashed the funding of the high-tech sector of the renewable energy industry, while preserving jobs in the coal industry. The CDU destroys the environment at the expense of German taxpayers and plays into the hands of major concerns. As a result, the younger generation will have to pay with its future for the CDU’s irresponsible policy.

**Foreign policy: vote of no confidence in the hypocrites.** As far as Germany’s foreign policy is concerned, Rezo believes that the United States is not trustworthy. He accuses the government of conniving with U.S. policies, which he describes as unceremonious and defiant of international law. The author blames the CDU for spreading violence and terrorism, specifically for letting the U.S. use the Ramstein airbase. The representative of Germany’s younger generation has demonstrated a very realistic vision of strategic security: in case of nuclear war, for instance, between Russia and the United States, the Russians will try to do away with Germany as soon as possible in order to eliminate nuclear weapons located in its territory. So, Germany’s position is no good strategically. For this reason, many Germans protest against
the deployment of foreign armed forces in the country. Amazingly, the blogger sidestepped the theme of Russia’s alleged meddling in the European/U.S. elections, Russian hackers, and other clichés.

Public response. The German public came out in Rezo’s support: 90 stars of German YouTube released a joint video with a call on their fans against voting for the CDU, CSU, SDP and Alternative for Germany. The main target of criticism, the CDU, for a long time refrained from giving an official answer to the charges, except for tweets by several members of the party. In the end, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Merkel’s successor as the CDU leader, made an official statement, promising to react “to attempts at influencing the public opinion” (Meinungsmache) ahead of the elections, which many interpreted as an encroachment on the freedom of speech in the Internet. The official video posted in response by a young CDU member Philipp Amthor, was deleted from the world web. “This time we will not participate in populist debates. simplification of political issues and incitement are populists’ tools...” The party’s attempt to interpret the younger generation’s vision as a manifestation of populism will merely worsen the CDU’s positions. Many young members of the Christian-Democratic Union are critical of the leadership’s stance.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

First. In German society there has emerged a great demand for changing the country’s political course. The people do not feel that the members of the political establishment represent their interests. The population sees no signs how current policy is correlated with their everyday life. The reaction of the party’s leadership to the crucial problems of the youth merely confirms this conclusion.

Second. The ecological agenda of the Greens in Germany is successful because the party is keen to provide a scientific basis for its goals. Professionals who care about the future of the nation and the globe look far more attractive to the electorate than the leaders of traditional parties, which, according to the disillusioned, push ahead with their inequality-breeding policy in the interests of large corporations and wealthy groups of the population, thus turning away from crucial social problems, in particular, those of the younger generation.

Third. The problem of migration in Germany has been pushed to the sidelines. Fearsome populism as represented by the Alternative for
Germany has given in to pressures from the left-wingers and the Greens. Or has it just changed disguises? It is difficult to say if environmental protection will be the main course of Germany’s policy in the nearest future, or if this topic is just in vogue. One way or another, the problem of populism, let alone the suspicion the shadow of Russia is looming behind, was not exploited in Germany’s elections this time, which gives some hope for the stabilization of relations.

Fourth. In the foreseeable future Europe will be busy sorting out its internal problems, while relations with Russia will drift into the background. The likely sphere for establishing cooperation and mending trust should be seen in education and science, specifically, the green economy, innovations, etc. The younger generation of Europeans appreciate professionalism. Their attitude to Russia is by and large more neutral than that of their parents, so interaction in this field may be productive and strategically beneficial.

Fifth. The claims that the current climate policy is in a disaster must be considered in a special profound study. At this point the most important thing is that the European youth and part of the older generation are uniting around the idea of environmental protection, which is well seen in the results of the elections to the European Parliament. They have shown that Europeans are prepared to make decisions on the basis of this narrative. In particular, their opinion has changed the lineup of political forces in Germany. Now the traditional parties will be forced to include the green agenda in their platforms so as not to let power slip away.

What do these trends mean to Russia, a country that specializes in the production and export of hydrocarbons? The future of Nord Stream and other energy projects may soon be called in question. Russia should remember that the arguments in favor of natural gas as the most ecologically clean fuel are not on trend today. The green agenda stays focused on renewable sources. The public narrative automatically writes off natural gas and hydrocarbons in general as outdated sources of energy. Special clever promotion efforts may be required to blend the gas theme in with the fashionable ecological agenda.

THE SDP’S FUTURE

The Social Democratic party showed the worst results in the European Parliament elections. Their leader Andrea Nahles had to step down.
The party now pins hopes on Kevin Kuehnert, the leader of the youth wing Jusos, who is pressing for a policy of ideological renewal.

In an interview given after the European Parliament elections, Kuehnert said the SDP had been losing support not only of young voters, but also of the people about 60 years of age. He argues that reshuffles (Andrea Nahles’s resignation) alone won’t help. Digital technology policies and resistance to climate change were central to the election campaign. Kuehnert said the electorate did not associate the SDP with this agenda. Internal strife prevents the party from achieving success, debates about the SDP’s future are confined to discussions of personalities.

In his opinion, the Social Democrats should convey the idea to the voters that climate change is really one of their priorities. Snatching the hobby horse of global warming away from the Greens will be a no easy task, so the leader of Jusos suggests focusing on the potential of practical climate policy: innovations and technologies of the future, including their implementation in the automotive industry. Kuehnert recalls that the Greens say nothing about the redistribution of profit, financial inequality and the availability of social benefits, so the SDP may use this agenda as its trump card.

Kuehnert is trying to breathe a new life into a party whose ideology was based formed back in the 19th century: he raises the theme of struggle against capitalism in its current shape. His proposals, for instance, the idea of nationalizing the BMW have evoked a mixed response from the SDP and society. Asked by Der Spiegel magazine “What is your opinion of Kuehnert’s proposal for nationalizing large corporations?” most respondents (51%) chose the option “Very negative.”

Apart from nationalizing enterprises, the leader of Jusos called for restricting the right to own real estate, suggesting each person should be allowed to own the housing that is the permanent place of residence, adding that ideally the institution of housing rent should be abolished. A well-expected storm of criticism followed: his fellow party members interpreted this as a phantom of class struggle. Kuehnert replied, though, that the party’s program proclaimed socialism as the SDP’s official goal.

What conclusions can be made? Kuehnert’s attempt to invigorate the SDP is its sole chance of survival. He is keen to update the party’s ideology (established one and a half centuries ago) without changing the fundamental values, while at the same time proposing an agenda that
could be of interest to the voters and looking for a new niche for creating a new brand of the SDP’s that the electorate could accept. The German establishment has launched a crusade against his experiments and some ideas drew criticism from the voters. At the same time, certain proposals have sparked interest. Firstly, the intention to adopt as the party’s main course practical implementation of the climate policy (use of environmentally friendly technologies, priority for new energy and the introduction of green innovations in industrial production). In this capacity the SDP might serve as a bridge between the public, which demands a drastic change of the country’s climate policy, and big businesses. Secondly, Kuehnert feels that tensions in society are growing, but for the time being he is unable to devise a suitable ideology—nationalization of big businesses and the struggle with capitalism sound unnatural and radical. Possibly, he should heed Rezo’s point, namely, that the root causes of the problem are malfunctioning “social lifts” (above all, in education), an unfair tax policy and inequality by inheritance. If Kuehnert adds these ideas to his political arsenal, his party may well improve its shattered positions.

Today we are witnessing a transformation of the ideological and political landscape in Germany and in Europe as a whole. If the leadership of the main parties heeds the expectations of society and youth, then transition may happen without major upheavals. There are reasons to hope that the new generation of Europeans will be able to achieve consensus in the name of Europe where they grew up—that of its “golden age.”
Authors

Vera AGYEYVA, Associate Professor, Department of Applied Political Science, St. Petersburg School of Social Science and Oriental Studies, National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Russia

Muamer BECIROVIC, District Chairman of the Young People’s Party (Junge ÖVP) in Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus, Austria; publisher of the Kopf um Krone online magazine

Leyla DASKIN, Security Policy Advisor, Directorate for Security Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Austria

Katrina ILYINSKAYA, Publisher of the Forbes magazine in Latvia; Member of the Baltic Forum Board

Weronika KSIĄŻEK, journalist, Poland

Thomas MEANEY, freelance writer, a fellow at the American Council on Germany, Berlin

Igor OKUNEV, Associate Professor at the MGIMO University, the Russian Foreign Ministry; Executive Editor of Comparative Politics online journal, Russia

Agnieszka PIWAR, publicist, author of numerous commentaries, including on documentaries, Poland

Anastasia POGORELSKAYA, Deputy Director, Center for International Scientific Cooperation; Senior Lecturer, Department of World Politics, Tomsk State University, Russia

Natalia POMOZova, Deputy Head, International Relations Department, the “United Russia” Party, Russia

Yevgenia PROKOPCHUK, analyst, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Russia

Alexander VYSOTSKY, Administration Officer of the International Cooperation Department, Central Office of the Government of the Russian Federation

Anna ZHIKHAREVA, project manager, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia